THE PLACE OF THE UNIVERSITY IN NATIONAL LIFE

An Address to the Canadian Educational Association

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY

THE Canadian Educational Association has been discussing various problems of administration, ideal, and curriculum, mainly in connection with the elementary and secondary schools of the Dominion; but the circle of its interest would not be complete if the relation of the university to the nation were not recognized and discussed. As "education" simply means the nutrition or bringing up of the individual to maturity, its process is really continuous from the earliest to the latest stage of the life of man. The school covers the state's effort in the fields of primary, secondary, and higher education. These three fields are interdependent. I have been asked to speak to you on the relation of the university to the general life of the community. The university is at once a source of individual culture and of public service. It deepens and enriches personality, and through the enriched personality of its members it can be a servant of the whole nation. Culture and service are its ideals.

The university is one of the oldest existing institutions of Western civilization. The Christian Church and Roman law are older. The university has witnessed the rise and fall of dynasties and empires, the migration of tribes and peoples, the discovery of continents, and revolutions in the intellectual, social, and political life of mankind. It has inspired almost every great movement of the Western world which has an intellectual origin or aspect. Never

was its responsibility so heavy as it is to-day; never was its opportunity greater. View the university not as a mass of brick and stone and steel, not even as a collection of books, or as a group of laboratories and classrooms, but as a great human ideal. That ideal has been well expressed by President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia, in these words, "the free pursuit of truth by scholars in association, partly for the joy of discovery in the pursuit of knowledge; partly for the service to one's fellows through the results of discovery and the pursuit of knowledge." Into the thousand years of university history have been built great names, noble characters, and fine achievements. We may be assured that, if it remains true to its best traditions and high purposes, it will endure through the ages to come as a force of discipline and reverent freedom and as a great benefactor of mankind. The mottoes found in two great universities well express the ideal a true university seeks to realize. On a gate entering the grounds of Harvard are these words: "Enter to grow in wisdom; depart to serve thy country and mankind." On the facade of the ancient Italian University of Padua are Latin words which may be rendered thus: "Enter that you may daily become wiser than in the past. Go forth that you may daily become more useful to your country and the Church." These mottoes suggest two points: first, what the university is in itself; second, what the university can do for the state.

I. The University in Itself

The university represents the organized will and power of the community to promote all that makes for intellectual advance and moral elevation. It is the reflex of the ambitions, ideals, and hopes of the age in which we live.

It is the natural centre and culmination of the educational system of a country.

It is the ultimate, formal expression which men give to their method of properly training their fellowmen. At the heart of the educational process, giving it direction and dignity, lies the most precious thing in the world—human personality. The university is the testing field for personality and for intellectual power. Under this testing new powers are discovered and developed, and responsibility grows for capable and wise self-direction.

It is the visible evidence of the respect which the state pays to learning and science. It is a symbol of how much there is in life beyond material development and commercial success. It should, therefore, be the home of great ideals and the nursing mother of great characters.

The university will exercise at least four functions:

(1) It will seek to train and guide the younger generation. Teaching is an important feature in its discipline. It will teach by lecture, by laboratory, by stimulation, by the impact of personality, of the personality of the teacher on that of the student, of the personality of student on student. Its teachers are presumed to be men of high excellence and some degree of originality.

(2) It will conserve the knowledge of the past. It is really the trustee of the treasures of past thought for the common use of mankind. It opens the door of the past and makes the achievements of the past the challenge and the starting point for the improvement of the future.

(3) It seeks to increase the content of knowledge. Its aim is the constant and thorough pursuit of truth. It is always pushing out the border-line between the known and the unknown. Research thus constitutes one of the chief functions of a modern university. It seeks to extend the realm of knowledge apart from any utilitarian

value, confident that all knowledge increases the power of man. It spreads the pure light of disinterested studies, of knowledge for its own sake, over an ever-widening area.

(4) It seeks to disseminate knowledge; to pour out the fruits of its experience and wisdom before the people so that they may share those fruits to their great advantage and the enrichment of life. University extension thus becomes as essential to the modern university as the work of research.

The university gives to all who seek it the opportunity of gaining a liberal education in the arts and sciences. It trains the specialist, but it seeks to make him more than a narrow specialist. It seeks to humanize him. It would not sacrifice breadth of outlook, zest and range of intellectual curiosity about all things that contribute to the knowledge or enrich the life of man. If academic culture is to be real, it must involve a certain breadth of view.

The university instils into men and women worthy ideals of clear thinking and social service. It seeks to develop within the student himself understanding, appreciation, a proper sense of values, and competency in his own special field.

It provides a genial and stimulating home for the creative minds of the day. The close relations between teachers and taught create an atmosphere in which the intellectual development of both is stimulated.

Thus the Faculty of Arts remains the essence and the glory of the university. Where the spirit and the methods of this faculty do not inform and penetrate, there can scarcely be a university. In the true university everything is not subordinated to that which is immediately gainful and practical. It houses those scholarly aspirations which make for spiritual insight, depth, and beauty, but which "cannot be transmuted into any coin less base

than the highest human service." It is an uncomfortable home for greed, jealousy, vanity, or boastfulness. Its rivalry is only in the pursuit of truth and in the service of one's country or mankind. "Its jewels" are the men who make it and the men whom it makes.

In whatsoever part of the world true universities exist, they will have one common aim. That aim is to teach their members to understand the meaning of things in their universal relations. Even in the so-called practical or professional faculties fundamental principles are taught. Underlying all practice is theory, and all things stand in relation to one another and to the ultimate mind. The distinctive work of the university is to elucidate this theory, and to point out these general relationships. Facts may seem to be confused and complicated, but in dealing with these, the university seeks for the fundamental principles. The late Lord Haldane well said that "not only in philosophy but in science it is true that no systematic knowledge is sufficient in itself, unless it leads up to and points to first principles." He believed that it was only in the larger atmosphere of a university that the finest kind even of technical education could be attained.

II. The University as the Servant of the Community

The aim of the university is not to develop a self-centred culture, but to use knowledge, culture, and discipline, in the service of the community. It freely offers its treasures to all who will take them.

(1) The university relates itself in closest fashion to the needs and aspirations of the community and the state. The task of the university grows greater as the difficulties of democracy grow heavier and more numerous. No

institution is comparable to the university in answering the challenge of world unrest and dissension, and in expounding and maintaining a sane concept and practice of democracy. It is of vital importance to our democracy that our citizens should understand our history, our modern civilization, our basic principle of freedom, and that they should possess a sound sense of values about the course and achievements of our present political and social organization. To supply this understanding what type and quality of education are needed? The elementary and secondary schools will scarcely be adequate for the training by which we may be adjusted to these changing and testing days. It is to the universities that men must more and more look for the wide dissemination of the proper sort of education at the higher levels. This education is likely to prove the chief safeguard of a worthy democracy.

The preservation of our British democracy, under which for a thousand years our English-speaking people have been steadily building a civilization based on principles in which they believed, will not be made sure by the development of a bureaucracy however intelligent, but is possible only on the basis of a diffusion of knowledge and an increased sense of responsibility among the general body of citizens. Our aim is not to produce a passive population, no matter how benevolently governed, but a well-informed and well-disposed citizenship which will set up or criticize, retain or dismiss, its government. From our universities chiefly may we look for defenders of our age-old principles, defenders who can show how they may be adapted to changed and changing conditions. I know no better or briefer statement of these principles than one I heard given last summer by Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler to the "Pilgrims" of London. These fundamental prin-

ciples of democracy are mainly the following: (*a*) The subordination of government to public opinion, not of public opinion to government. (*b*) The setting up of a government with power to do those things for the common good which it is essential to do, in such fashion that justice and kindliness and humanity shall formulate and guide our public policies. (*c*) The reservation of the largest possible sphere of civil, economic, and political liberty to the citizens; in which sphere the citizen is to be encouraged to do everything in his power for public service, justice, and human kindness. (*d*) The citizens at stated intervals are to choose in their own established way a representative body of legislators who through open discussion and debate shall adopt such policies for the guidance and government of the people as public opinion will uphold. (*e*) The executive power is not to be in absolute control of the legislative, and the judicial power is to be independent.

These have been the principles of our democracy, slowly discovered and applied through the centuries. Whatever forms of government are devised to meet the present needs and to harmonize with the best traditions of other peoples, we believe that for us these principles, intelligently held and honestly and efficiently applied, will prevent injustice and exploitation and will minister to the growth and well-being of the nation as a whole and of its individual citizens.

Democracy is sailing in these days through very troubled waters. It will come safely through only if the individual citizen is interested, honest, and intelligent. For the proper education of the citizen body a heavy burden of responsibility and action lies on the university. I believe that the verdict of the university thinker will be that there is no reason why we should surrender our

principles of democracy and our philosophy of freedom, and that we can deal satisfactorily with the injustice, suffering, and unhappiness, caused by new economic conditions, without overturning and destroying the very foundations on which our civilization rests.

(2) The universities train teachers for the secondary schools and for many of the larger primary schools. Through this group of graduates the universities touch the whole educational system. The quality of instruction and the mental stimulus given by the secondary-school teachers largely determine the intellectual interest, the public spirit, the literary status, and the moral tone of each generation as it passes from adolescence to manhood. The quality of these teachers and their power to inspire fine ideals in youthful minds depend in turn on the spirit which their university has breathed into them, and on the high conceptions it has given them of what intellectual energy and enjoyment really mean.

(3) Universities provide the highest training in the application of science to all departments of life. From the national point of view this aspect of university service is of inestimable value. We need the trained scientists to discover the full extent of our natural resources and to improve and develop our methods of industry. We need skill, vision, and informed organizing ability, to turn our agricultural, industrial, and commercial possibilities into glowing realities. We need the clearest reasoning and the most effective action of our best-trained citizens to deal with our economic problems, social difficulties, and political tasks. All this equipment the university is designed to supply. Universities should focus whatever information the sciences can provide for any form of service to the state. They should place their knowledge of economic history and of economic experiments in all countries at the

disposal of administrative officials and legislatures. From the trained staff of a university will naturally come investigators in scientific, economic, or historical fields, whose range and accuracy of knowledge will make them helpful colleagues of practical men charged with making such inquiries.

(4) The university trains men for service in every sphere of work, more particularly for leadership. The country needs citizens with ample knowledge and clear thought. These elements the university graduate should in considerable measure possess. As a citizen the university-trained man should contribute to his country these qualities among others: (*a*) The spirit of progress, which hopes because it is always seeking to improve conditions by knowledge and skill and actually is improving them. (*b*) The spirit of moderation, which is cautious because it knows that one-sidedness is easy and is vehement; that to most questions there are various aspects; and that there is a tendency to grasp at hasty expedients. (*c*) Tolerance, which is not indifference or indecisiveness, but is simply willingness to allow others to hold their convictions with the same tenacity and intelligence as we ourselves, we think, hold ours. (*d*) Love of truth, which appreciates the value of systematized knowledge, which keeps the mind open to new ideas, and which holds prejudices and preconceptions in due control. This love of truth compels thorough knowledge of our life-task. No attractiveness of personality can ever make up for ignorance of one's job. It may be a valuable appendage to a man's professional equipment, but it is not an equipment in itself.

Men possessed of the true academic spirit can help to form sound and strong public opinion and can furnish

skilled workers and leaders in commercial, industrial, social, political, and religious movements.

(5) There is another service which the university can render to its members and to its constituency. It can foster a sound patriotism and at the same time develop the international mind. A proper and religious patriotism recognizes the basic place of love for one's own land, and also the place which every country holds in relation to the commonwealth of the world. Into the City of God, the ideal state, all the nations of the earth shall bring their own special glory, gift, genius, or other contribution. The university will seek to keep the proper balance and relation between nationalism and internationalism. Perhaps to-day the special task of the university is to give the international outlook. The great era of nation-building is passing into the era of international co-operation. We must learn that each nation can prosper only if the rest of the world prospers with it. The animosities and resentments which accompanied the process of nation-building through the centuries, must be overcome in that spirit of large human sympathy and justice which a university is intended to create. Knowledge knows no geographical limits and speaks no single language. Philosophic interpretation and scientific investigation overpass all national boundaries. The university, the natural home of these high and universal pursuits, will seek to create and to cherish the intellectual insight and moral power which will enable men to act as national citizens of an international community, and will claim leadership in promoting international understanding, co-operation, and responsibility for the solution of the grave world-problems which, while they remain unsolved, threaten the continued existence of civilization itself.

(6) The university must not overlook its duty to

present and conserve aesthetic values. The beautiful is linked with the true and the good. The history and interpretation of art will stimulate an appreciation for the beautiful and will exercise a beneficent influence on every field of human activity. The great aim of art is to present the reality of things under the form of the beautiful. More and more the university will become an apostle of things pure and lovely and of good report.

III. The University as an Asset to Canada

The university man owes a duty of national service to his country. Normally his work efficiently done constitutes that service. In order to live we must be consumers of wealth. That wealth by work we seek to replace. Further, because we are living in a civilized society we owe to it, for what it gives us, more than we can easily give to it. For these two reasons it is just that every man, and especially the university man, should contribute good work to his nation. Every Canadian can make his contribution to Canada's welfare, progress, and greatness, by seeking his lifework, if possible, in Canada; by bringing his trained intelligence to bear on Canada's problems; by discharging his citizen duties to Canada; and by standing for the highest things in Canada. He stands for these highest things by cultivating a richer intellectual and artistic life; by cultivating the neglected art of thinking; by being faithful to the moral elements of the national and individual situation; and by fostering the religious sense of reverence for God and man, without which no state can long endure.

We must discover the extent of our material heritage, and apply our trained intelligence and the results of scientific research to its development and to the encourage-

ment of final processes of manufacture; but we must not lose our soul in the multitude of things. In their possession neither the life of an individual nor of a nation consists. Make room for the cultivation of the things of the mind and the soul—for art, for literature, for religion. Our growing sense of the wonder of this strange modern life may deepen into a religious spirit. Religion alone holds the key to the highest well-being of a nation.

We are too prone to compute the wealth of the nation merely in terms of the material and in terms of mere numbers. Real wealth lies in ideas and ideals. The poets, the writers, the thinkers, the religious teachers have made their contribution to this wealth, as well as the scientists. No nation can long survive if it has not a clear conception of duty, a lofty idea of service, and a belief in primary virtues and eternal truths.

The greatness of a state is no greater than the character of the average citizen. If that citizen is sober, industrious, intelligent, self-sacrificing, God-fearing, then his country is likely to play a worthy part in human advance. "Wealth," it has well been said, "lies not primarily in veins of the earth, but in the hearts of the people." We are more likely to possess real wealth of soul in days of difficulty than in days of abounding material prosperity. But our real prosperity will always be greatest when we cherish and realize moral and spiritual ideals, and when a moral and spiritual destiny beckons us on.

At the last meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the President, Sir James Jeans, quoted the words of one of his recent predecessors in the office: "Science has given man control over nature before he has gained control over himself;" and added, "The tragedy does not lie in man's scientific control over nature

but in his absence of moral control over himself." Moral control is our greatest need.

The university transmits the sacred fire of learning from the past; its present ideal is to discipline the intelligence, to widen the sympathy, and to quicken the imagination of its members; but all the while it knows that the supreme emphasis must be placed on character. The greatest intellectual brilliance will not atone for lack of the aspirations we call spiritual and the motives we call good. The Great Examiner is best pleased with those who enter manhood and womanhood with "clean hands and a pure heart," listening to the call of duty and service, and cherishing that fear of the Lord which is the beginning and the end of wisdom.

THE SPIRIT OF GREEK LITERATURE

GILBERT NORWOOD

I

IN dealing with a topic so difficult and elusive as this, precision must be sought almost as earnestly as Truth herself. First, then, let me define my period. I shall restrict myself to that part of Greek literature which is not only the greatest but also the most distinctively Greek—that is, those authors who wrote before Greece, first through the victories of Alexander, then through the Roman conquest, became part of a far wider world with novel politics, new religions, and conceptions of life that made the Hellenic spirit a thing not indeed dead but a now distant beacon instead of a daily sunlight.

This period stretches from Homer to Aristotle and Demosthenes: by a strange chance, the greatest scientist and the greatest orator of antiquity both died within a few months of Alexander, perhaps its greatest soldier. Even thus reduced, our period may well appear gigantic: it covers some seven centuries of immense and varied literary achievement.

But still further concentration is needed. If we are to gain any clear impression, we must keep to the quintessence, ignoring perforce many qualities of many Greeks and much of their literature. What, then, is the central quality of this mass—epic and lyric poetry, history and philosophy, tragic and comic drama, oratory? Can we attempt to summarize in a phrase men like Plato and Aeschylus? Are we to draw out leviathan with a hook, to play with him as with a bird, or bind him for our maidens? Formidable as this enterprise may be, many

before me have essayed it. Few of us have not heard that the essence of the Greek spirit is a feeling for beauty, or a sense of proportion, or allegiance to reason. Yet all these seem to me one-sided, inadequate, misleading. I discern little of the sovereignty of reason in Pindar, small feeling for beauty in Demosthenes, nor could Aristophanes reckon among his vast merits a sense of proportion.

No: I can see but one quality that is common to all these otherwise so divergent geniuses: an instinct to keep close to immediate fact—in their own phrase, "the things before our feet." Yet I believe that the more we consider this, the less commonplace it will seem.

This instinct, as found in literature, means saying in memorable language exactly what one means—no less *and* no more. This will appear not worth stating until we realize that most other writers do *not* say what they mean. We moderns are so steeped in our own poetry and prose that to realize this simple fact is hard for us. Exaggeration has come, by incessant repetition, to sound like sober truth. Therefore I find myself compelled to bring out my point by comparison of ancient and modern forms.

Let us begin with a brief instance:

> And my fause luver staw my rose,
> But left the thorn wi' me.

He did nothing of the sort. What he did was to leave her to grief and the memory of past joy. You will exclaim: "Yes! But Burns has put it vastly better than you." To be sure he has—most beautifully and poignantly. But he has gained this effect by a lovely and felicitous untruth, an untruth which does not trouble us in the least, because we are brought up on the language of

metaphor. Now, Sappho also puts it vastly better than I, but how?

> Maidenhood, maidenhood, whither art thou fled and left me?
> Never shall I return to thee, never again to thee, never return.

That is fact, and nothing but fact.

Consider next the first two stanzas of Shelley's *Song to Night:*

> Swiftly walk o'er the western wave,
> Spirit of Night!
> Out of the misty eastern cave,
> Where all the long and lone daylight
> Thou wovest dreams of joy and fear,
> Which make thee terrible and dear,—
> Swift be thy flight!
>
> Wrap thy form in a mantle gray,
> Star-inwrought!
> Blind with thine hair the eyes of Day;
> Kiss her until she be wearied out;
> Then wander o'er city, and sea, and land,
> Touching all with thine opiate wand—
> Come, long-sought!

Some twenty-five centuries earlier the lyrist Alcman wrote another poem about Night. Here is a charming and very close version written by Professor Woodhead of McGill University:

> Asleep is the mountain crest:
> The deep ravines and the headlands are hushed and still:
> The creeping things that the black earth rears are at rest,
> And the beasts that roam the hill.
>
> The busy murmuring bees
> Slumber in silence. Slumber the shadowy herds
> That dwell in the cavernous depths of the purple seas,
> And the long-winged flock of birds.

You cannot fail to note the same difference as before:

beauty drawn from fact; beauty created by suggestion.

Let us now seek something as unlike Burns and Sappho, Alcman and Shelley, as excellent writing can be, a passage of elaborate prose. It so happens that two of the greatest prose-writers have, each in his own manner, described the secret of their countries' greatness. First let us have an extract from Burke's noble answer to the attack made by the Duke of Bedford upon his pension:

> As long as the well-compacted structure of our Church and State, the sanctuary, the holy of holies of that ancient law, defended by reverence, defended by power, a fortress at once and a temple, shall stand inviolate on the brow of the British Sion,—as long as the British monarchy, not more limited than fenced by the orders of the state, shall, like the proud Keep of Windsor, rising in the majesty of proportion, and girt with the double belt of its kindred and coeval towers, as long as this awful structure shall oversee and guard the subjected land,—so long the mounds and dykes of the low fat Bedford level will have nothing to fear from all the pickaxes of all the levellers of France. As long as our sovereign lord the King, and his faithful subjects, the lords and commons of this realm,—the triple cord which no man can break,—the solemn, sworn, constitutional frank-pledge of this nation,—the firm guaranties of each other's being and each other's rights . . . as long as these endure, so long the Duke of Bedford is safe, and we are all safe together.

Compare with this a few lines from that memorable Funeral Speech delivered by Pericles in the second book of Thucydides:

> . . .Our whole city is to my mind the school of Greece; and each citizen will be found to surpass all foreigners in the number of situations and the variety of graces wherein he shows his versatile physical competence. This is no empty vaunt of the hour, but truth to fact, proved by that national strength which has been won by such character. Alone of all powers in our age Athens shows herself, when put to the test, greater

> than her reputation. . . . Great are the tokens, many are the witnesses to our might that we can summon for the astonishment of present and future ages. We need no Homer for our eulogist, no voice to raise a moment's romantic ecstasy before truth shatters the belief in our deeds. Every sea, every land we have compelled to give foothold to our valour: throughout the world we have raised to our successes, and to our reverses, joint memorials that will never die.

The Greek gains his effect by telling the truth, and the exact truth. Instead of vague eulogies—as that "Athens has a mighty future before her" or that "we have as yet only scratched the surface"—Thucydides makes that strangely precise statement which compels clear full realization: the statement that an Athenian's *body* is versatile. Side by side with this precision observe the absence of untruthfulness, or (if you wish) of misstatement, of exaggeration. Even that famous phrase, "Athens is the school of Greece," is no metaphor but mere fact. Now, Burke handles the same theme—the secret of his country's greatness. But could two such passages be more unlike? Here is a mass of metaphor piled upon metaphor, of cords and pickaxes, hands made of iron, belts made of masonry, Windsor and Solomon's Temple. The Greek makes us *know* the truth by holding it close to our gaze, showing "the very age and body of the time, his form and pressure;" Burke makes us *feel* the truth by suddenly appealing to emotions already existing and evoked originally by other spectacles and alien traditions.

What are the fruits of this Greek instinct to keep one's eye on the immediate fact? Clearness, simplicity, a sense of outline. Though all Greek writers of this period show all three, they differ in the amount of these qualities that they each show. In Pindar a sense of outline is more noticeable than clearness and simplicity. In Hesiod simplicity is the chief of the three. And so forth. The

following remarks, however, fall under but two quite separate headings: clearness and the sense of outline. What is to be noted about simplicity will emerge of itself by the way.

II

First, then, for clearness: this is shown in expression, in thought, and in feeling.

Lucidity in expression has been observed incidentally in our treatment of those three pairs of extracts from Greek and English; but I will offer one that makes my point with sharp, indeed painful, precision. In one of Demosthenes' numerous attacks upon Philip, King of Macedonia, occurs a trenchant outbreak which I translated years ago for another purpose. Let me quote this version and briefly demonstrate the difference between my pompous idiom and what the orator actually said:

> The partisans of Philip understand so exactly both sides of his mind that they all look on men as friends or foes by their master's standard, conceiving every detail of their conduct in Athens as well-known to Philip as if he stood at their side. How scandalous by comparison is the lot of those whose lives are dedicated to your service, whose ambition is your approval, whose loyalty has never betrayed it! Deaf ears, blind eyes! I plead to-day before an assembly, to which every aspect of this affair is familiar, with no more acceptance than these miscreants command. Why? If I may crave your indulgence for a candid statement, I imagine that Philip entertains gratitude or resentment with the whole-heartedness appropriate to an individual, whereas no Athenian feels personal concern in any man's public conduct, good or bad, but is every day misled by innumerable private and more effectual interests, pity, malice, anger, generosity, or (if all other impediments fail) a downright prejudice against public spirit in general. These faults of individuals constitute in their entirety a disease that is sapping the life of Athens.

I select three scraps only. (i) "If I may crave your indulgence for a candid statement." Demosthenes says, literally: "Well, I will explain, and I request that none of you be angry with me telling the facts." (ii) "The whole-heartedness appropriate to an individual." Demosthenes wrote: "With all his heart, having a single body and a single soul." (iii) "A downright prejudice against public spirit in general." Demosthenes: "Those who are unwilling that anyone should be such as I have described."

Now, candidly, is not the reader inclined to remark: "Your translation may be poor stuff, but it is a great deal better than what Demosthenes (to judge by the literal rendering) actually wrote. 'Unwilling that anyone should be such,' indeed! What bald chat! Not worth reading or hearing!"? If he feels so—and an enormous number of modern people, if they would confess the truth, do feel so—my remark made at the outset is fully justified. The Greeks, I said, insist on keeping close to immediate fact, and I went on to suggest that this quality was not so commonplace as might appear. Now, in this passage we find Demosthenes saying just what he means—no less and no more—and he seems to us utterly insipid. But his facts—his thoughts—are plainly the same as in my version. The conclusion is that we moderns live on words—live on them to a degree terribly dangerous. The Greeks lived on ideas—a diet equally perilous, but less stupefying.

III

And next, clearness of thought. In the philosophers (and by no means only in the philosophers) of Greece, quite apart from the sublimity or the usefulness of their thoughts, we are to note how beautifully their thinking suits its themes, as in those superimposed triangles of

Euclid, where each corner comes down so exactly upon its fellow. The result is that we understand perfectly. Pick up any dialogue of Socrates in Plato or Xenophon: you begin with a conviction that the subject is too trivial for discussion, or that it is too vague to be seized, or too profound to be fathomed. By the time Socrates has moved off to the next group of gossips, you see the whole thing as plainly as he does. This superb lucidity of brain-work and exposition thereof is quite as evident in Plato, the most profound of ancient writers, as in Xenophon, perhaps the most boyish.

But Socratic dialogues are long: let me offer something simple and brief. Zeno, the Eleatic philosopher, wished to prove that Time and Space are illusions. You and I might evolve various arguments, but it is conceivable that our antagonists would walk away before we had done. Not with Zeno. People still, after twenty-five centuries, repeat his problem of Achilles and the Tortoise. Achilles is the speediest of men, a tortoise the slowest of creatures. But let them run a race, giving the tortoise (say) only one hundred yards' start, and Achilles can never overtake it. Why not? Because Achilles has to run that hundred yards; and when he has done so, the tortoise is still ahead, having begun to—well, to move at the same time as the hero. And when Achilles has covered this new distance, the tortoise has again gone ahead; and so *ad infinitum*. "That is ridiculous, you tell me?" exclaims Zeno. "Maybe, but I defy you to tell me how. I have used your own notions of Time and Space; and so long as you retain these you have got to believe that Achilles is always behind. Take your choice!"

Again, in Aristotle—I was about to say that one can find thousands of instances. But the case is far stronger than that. The whole of his vast body of writing

is an example—nay, it is a complete exposition of this principle. He is the grand master of pigeon-holes, the patron-saint of those who make filing-cabinets. Above all, it was he who at one blow invented the whole science of logic. No topic is too airy or too profound for that superbly clear intellect. Suppose I wished to discuss whether, there being essences of substance, and compounds of substance and other categories, there are essences of such compounds. My attempts at brevity and clearness would gain me very meagre garlands. Aristotle says: "If there is an idea of Man, is there also an idea of White Man? Well, call him Shirt." This at any rate is crisp. And a student of Aristotle who has read him up to that point will find it illuminating also.

But a nation is not clear-thinking merely because its professional philosophers are so. Do we find similar lucidity in other authors? Assuredly: I will quote but two writers whom I elsewhere ignore. Epicharmus, the Sicilian who created Greek Comedy, exists now only in fragments, but some are much to our purpose. "You are not generous: you simply have an itch to give things away." "You are not clever at speaking, but bad at silence." The other was an Athenian whose name we do not know, a member of the suppressed and hated oligarchical party. At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War he wrote an essay on Athenian democracy, wherein he showed a clearness of thinking about politics remarkable even for a Greek. Hating the democracy, he yet admires it for its open-eyed acceptance of facts, indeed its cynicism: Athens is great because she faces the implications of her own position—a democracy acting as a tyranny. Let one quotation suffice. "It is indeed possible to discover many ways of improving the *constitution*; but to secure that democracy shall survive and also

to discover an adequate improvement in public life is not easy."

The third kind or manifestation of clearness was clearness of feeling. It is the reverse of what we mean by sentimentality. Sentimentality is not keenness of feeling—that is sensitiveness—but an irrational subjection to feeling, a luxurious indulgence of emotion for its own sake. Jane Austen is sensitive; Dickens is sentimental. Among nations the Greeks were sensitive: to look for a sentimental nation would in an Englishman be unpatriotic.

This clarity of emotion, this sensitiveness, is a marked quality in Greek literature, but I cannot think of a single instance of sentimentality in this period. Antigone in Sophocles faces death rather than fail to render funeral rites to her brother. She explains that, had the dead man been her son or husband she would not have thus defied the king's edict, because she might perhaps have had another husband or child later; but, both her parents being dead, she cannot have another brother. This realistic dealing with an emotion may be observed again and again in Sophocles' contemporary, the historian Herodotus. An enormous number of his stories deal with the rise and results of emotion without any emotional comment. That is one element in his charm. The long thrilling detective-story about the Egyptian thief is told with fine detachment; so is the tale of Gyges' ring of invisibility, and many an episode of history in the strict sense. When he has to describe that ever-glorious feat of arms, the Battle of Marathon, he avoids passionate proclamation of its emotional interest, and writes thus at the close with poignant simplicity:

> The Athenians won, and pursued the fleeing Persians with slaughter, until reaching the sea they called for fire and laid hold of the Persian ships. In this tussle the Athenian com-

> mander-in-chief was slain, having shown himself a brave man; of the generals Stesilaus, son of Thrasylaus, died; also Cynaegirus, son of Euphorion, clutching a ship's stern timbers, had his hand chopped off with an axe, and fell.

Hesiod, the Boeotian peasant-farmer, shows himself a remorseless realist. After directions about harvesting he goes on: "But when you have stored all your livelihood ready in the house, turn your serf out of it and look for a childless slave-woman—one who has a kid in tow is a burden." (The slang is not mine, but Hesiod's.) If we talked to him about giving a preference to one who has a child to support, Hesiod would tell us grimly that he finds it hard enough to support himself.

Possibly the most impressive testimony of all is provided by that Funeral Speech in Thucydides which I have already quoted. What consolation has Pericles to offer the relatives of the fallen? This: a terrible consolation—nay, a mockery of consolation to any who do not feel with him a religious love for Athens herself:

> Some among you are of an age at which they may hope to have other children, and they ought to bear their sorrow better; not only will the children who may be born hereafter make them forget their own lost ones, but the City will be doubly a gainer. She will not be left desolate, and She will be safer.

But what of Euripides? Is he not sentimental? Can we insist that he, too, keeps his eye on the emotional fact, that he never crosses the line between sensitiveness—a keen realization of the emotional fact—and sentimentality, a witless bathing in emotion for the sake of the bath? Mrs. Browning's familiar lines—

> Our Euripides, the human,
> With his droppings of warm tears,
> And his touches of things common,
> Till they rose to touch the spheres—

do they not suggest the wrung hands, the wet handkerchief, a tepid welter of emotion unharassed by any sense of dignity or brains? Well! What do we find in the surviving nineteen plays? Certainly a great wealth of emotional passages, even dramas that are emotional throughout, such as *Medea*, *The Trojan Women*, *Ion*, *Orestes*. But everywhere emotion is under the firm control of intelligence—the author's, if not always the character's, intelligence. Two examples will exhibit his method of working: the first, a person defying emotion; the second, a person overcome by emotion.

The stage-character who defies emotion is nowhere in Greek better depicted than in Phaedra, the heroine of *Hippolytus*. The love-goddess, angered against Hippolytus, seeks to cause his death by filling his stepmother Phaedra with a passion for him, so that in the end his father may destroy him. Phaedra struggles against this love, and when her secret becomes known to her friends, certain ladies of Trozen, she makes a wonderful address to them. I must refrain from quoting the justly celebrated version of Professor Gilbert Murray, because in this passage he has used a richness of style which I cannot but think has small warrant in the original. Here the poet has been remarkably simple—practically writing in prose:

> Often before now in the long time of night have I reflected how lives are ruined. It seems to me that we fail, not in intellect, for good sense is found in many; no: this is the way to look at it. We know and realize the right, but we do not practise it, some through sloth, others through preferring some form of pleasure to righteousness. . . .
>
> Such being my thoughts, no spell exists powerful enough to defeat and dislodge me from my opinion. To you will I tell the journey of my heart. When love stabbed me, I studied how to bear it most honourably. So I began with silence and concealment of my malady; for the tongue cannot be trusted:

> it knows how to rebuke the thoughts of others, but brings countless sorrows upon itself. Next, I determined to bear this folly well by conquering it through chastity. Then, thirdly, finding that by these means I was not mastering the love-goddess, I decided that the best device—and none shall gainsay me—was to die.

Euripides here portrays a woman in terrible straits, attacked from without and at point to be betrayed from within, who faces her own passion with a noble blend of courage, pride, and full intellectual power. She defies emotion—does not minimize it or descend into weak though natural lamentation over it. She knows her plight yet retains the mastery of her sorely tried soul.

We now confront the instance most dangerous to my thesis—an Euripidean character overborne by emotion. King Admetus has been granted this boon, that when his destined hour of death arrives he shall live on if someone consents to die in his place. But though he inquired of all his kin and friends, he has found none who will agree to die for him except his wife Alcestis. At once you observe that here is a character prone to sentimentality: a man who will anxiously canvass his acquaintance for such a purpose is morally unbalanced, and such instability is one great source of the sentimental. On the day fixed, Alcestis bids him farewell, and he makes impassioned reply, some lines of which are especially to our purpose. I will give them in Professor Murray's translation, though his beautiful style frequently heightens the tone of the original.

> All the joys I knew,
> And joys were many, thou hast broken in two.
> Ah, I will find some artist wondrous wise
> Shall mould for me thy shape, thine hair, thine eyes,
> And lay it in thy bed; and I will lie
> Close, and reach out mine arms to thee, and cry

Thy name into the night, and wait and hear
My own heart breathe: "Thy love, thy love is near."
A cold delight. . . .

O God, if Orpheus' voice were mine, to sing
To Death's high Virgin and the Virgin's King,
Till their hearts failed them, down would I my path
Cleave, and naught stay me, not the Hound of Wrath,
Not the gray oarsman of the ghostly tide,
Till back to sunlight I had borne my bride.
But now, wife, wait for me till I shall come
Where thou art, and prepare our second home.

Much of this fine outburst is half-hysterical. Twice we come close to morbidity—that extreme which we have so long been seeking. But observe how the poet curbs the distraught Admetus. That idea of making an image of Alcestis to embrace—there he approaches sentimentality. Yes, but he does not luxuriate in this ecstasy: he at once pulls himself up: "a cold delight." Again, after his agonized dream of descending to the lower world in quest of her, he at once takes a grip of himself in words strangely flat by comparison, though at least equally moving: "But, now, wife, wait for me till I shall come."

IV

Of the three elements that I enumerated, one now remains: the Greek sense of outline.

Many nations in many periods have excelled in many arts; but if we seek perspective we shall say that the distinctive art of Ancient Europe was sculpture, as the distinctive art of Mediaeval Europe was painting, and the distinctive art of Modern Europe has been music. If I am right, we shall find the literature of those ages showing analogies with those three arts. Certainly as regards our period of seven hundred years we observe that, widely

various as the authors are in theme, in profundity, in twenty ways, all have this instinct for clear outline, for shape, for the sculpturesque. Examples crowd upon me: I had better mention a few at random and then exhibit one or two that are specially momentous. Herodotus is full of brilliant passages that cling to the mind, and they all centre about brightly-lit individual people: Themistocles confronting the Corinthian admiral before Salamis; Solon laying down the law of happiness in the treasure-chamber of Croesus; Xerxes flogging the sea in his wrath. Xenophon's narrative concerning the Retreat of the Ten Thousand has little about mountain scenery or the political lessons of that great adventure. No: he tells us of that tribe whose children throve so well on chestnuts and pickled dolphin that they were "nearly as wide as tall," the tempting expanse being entirely tattooed. Alcman the lyrist, addressing a chorus of girls for whom he has composed a dance, laments that he is too old to frolic with them: this doleful thought he puts into vivid words full of *outline*, a sense of figures: "No longer, ye maidens of honeyed utterance, voices of passion, can my limbs bear me; ah, would I were a kingfisher that flits with halcyons over the blossom of the wave, bearing a blithe heart, the sea-blue bird of spring!" Archilochus after a battle feels the horror of slaughter. How does he put it? Like Wordsworth—"What man has made of man," and so forth? No. "Seven corpses on the earth, and we haled them by the foot, a thousand murderers we." Demosthenes, at the climax of his greatest speech, describes how the news came to Athens that her dreaded foe, Philip of Macedon, had forced the pass and was ready to advance upon the city. Look at the phrases in which he forces the danger upon our *eyes*:

> Evening fell, and there came one with tidings for the Presiding Committee that Philip had seized Elateia. They were in the midst of dinner, and instantly rising from table some of them removed the occupants of the booths in the Market-Place and set fire to the hurdles, while others sent for the General Staff and summoned the trumpeter.

Aristophanes is vastly fond of exhibiting ideas by means of sensible objects: the comparison between the Aeschylean and the Euripidean styles is carried out by using a huge pair of scales; the havoc which war is raising amid the Greek states he draws by means of a great mortar in which the War-God pounds a salad—honey for Athens, cheese for Sicily, onions for Megara. Earliest of all, Homer is as impressive an instance as any. Among the innumerable vivid episodes in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, is there one that does not centre in—nay, consist of—persons, and persons intensely individualized? This is by no means necessary to epic sublimity. One of the noblest passages in *Paradise Lost* gains its terrific power from just the opposite effect—extreme vagueness of outline.

> The other shape,
> If shape it might be call'd, that shape had none
> Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb,
> Or substance might be call'd that shadow seem'd
> For each seem'd either; black it stood as night,
> Fierce as ten furies, terrible as hell,
> And shook a dreadful dart; what seem'd his head
> The likeness of a kingly crown had on.

Contrast with this fiend any person in Homer, even those whom he depicts as in the lower world—for instance, the phantom of Heracles: we are actually given a list of the figures enchased upon his baldric.

After this roving glance over our field, look at the two greatest examples of the instinct for outline, the avoidance of penumbra, of beautiful vagueness.

First, the drama. Athens invented for us the whole conception of tragic art and brought comedy to heights almost, if not quite, as lofty. And drama is the literary form *par excellence* that deals in crisp outline, in shapes and individualization. Furthermore, Aeschylus practically created tragedy single-handed. Why "furthermore"? Because my contention is reinforced by the fact that *Aeschylus* did this. For his genius was of such a cast that he would never have written tragedy at all had he not been a Greek. The spirit of his race—those instincts of which I speak—drew him into this form of work. By artistic education he was a lyric poet, by natural quality a religious philosopher. Why did he not compose long contemplative poems like Lucretius and Wordsworth? Surely that is the natural method (for a poet) of expounding deep and difficult religious themes? But Aeschylus is so dominated by this sculpturesque principle that he took naturally to dramatic form: nay, far more, he practically invented it for his own purpose. Is not this astonishing? In his one extant trilogy he sets himself to consider the relation between God and Man, more in particular the relation between Justice and Mercy—how Man may win freedom from moral guilt and punishment therefor. This, we should say, demands an unhurried development of study and argument. Aeschylus goes to work differently. He calmly assumes that the clash between Justice and Mercy never appears at all till it appears in its most complete, most challenging, and most dreadful shape in the story of Orestes. Thus he is enabled to throw what we call theological or moral abstractions into fully developed personal forms: Orestes, his mother, the avenging Furies, and the god Apollo.

Equally impressive is the metaphysical doctrine of Plato, the illustrious Theory of Ideas. Plato attacks the

hardest of all questions: What do we mean by "Being"? What do we mean when we say that a thing "is"? His answer, evolved through a long career of labour unparalleled for its combination of profundity, of variety, of literary splendour, of intellectual grandeur, of momentousness for mankind—his answer is what we usually name the Theory of Ideas. This very word "idea" is a Greek word whose meaning was "shape" or "form:" the meaning we always give to it is derived from Plato's use of it. Ask an earlier Greek what is the "idea" of a coin and he would say "flat and circular;" ask him "what idea lies behind this conduct?" and he would think you crazy. These Platonic ideas are eternal patterns laid up in Heaven—or, if you like, in the mind of God—and it is after these patterns or forms or shapes that all things are made or exist. When we say that anything "is," that verb means "reflects in matter the eternal immaterial shape or idea." Each horse is a copy in matter of the transcendental, immaterial idea of Horse. Precisely because the idea is carried out in matter (that is, in time-and-space conditions), it fails to mirror the idea perfectly; and this failure is what we call Evil. But though no particular thing represents the idea perfectly, it does represent it, so that the whole collection of particulars by its uniform characteristics does mirror the idea perfectly. To observe one horse alone is of no scientific use: isolated study of a black horse would make you think blackness vital to the idea of Horse. But study of the natural kind —all the horses—is true science; for, seeing white and gray horses as well as black, we learn that Horse in general—the idea—has no specific colour. This splendid theory is the foundation of our sciences—of our very notion of science. And it clearly comes from what I have called

the instinct for outline, for shape, working at the very root of Greek metaphysics.

* * *

Greek art gains its effects by a genius for concentration, for focusing itself upon some intense centre, as modern art gains its effects by a genius for radiation, for expansion from a centre into splendid efflorescence. That is why one gains small benefit from pitting Shakespeare against Sophocles or seeking to decide which is the nobler edifice, the Parthenon or the Cathedral of Chartres. God, we are told, "fulfils himself in many ways;" and his sons have found many forms of self-expression. The chief duty, and the deepest joy, of a student is to recognize, distinguish and relish as many of these as he can.

MENTAL IMAGERY AND STYLE IN WRITING

T. H. Pear

On a summer day in Austria, three years ago, I had two new experiences. By a journalist or a social philosopher they might be regarded as excellent raw material. I will try to treat them psychologically. Now, as I write, on a cold spring morning overlooking a very un-Austrian street, these memories reappear, and invite description, together with some of the problems which they offer to the student of expression in writing.

That same summer day, I saw a race for the automobile championship of the Semmering and a performance of *Der Rosenkavalier*. My pleasure in both these experiences was intense. To-day a string of visual images appears: the vivid black and white of the village street; the eager face of my host, a car-worshipper for whom Castrol is music in the nose; a world-famed driver, tall, fair, lolling on his running-board, eyes closed, pretending to sleep, perhaps to discourage hero-worship; onlookers scattering at a hair-pin bend, as a car, viciously jerking its tail into a heap of gravel, flings disdainful largesse over them. These are all clear as pictures in the mind. There is, too, a faint sound-memory: the approaching pulsing rhythm of the first racing car. It seems now to be preceded, not followed, by a long wisp of dust, thrown like a sound wave into nodes and loops. This, the literal-minded will object, never happened. Yet just now, as I wrote, I saw it. Then comes a cinematically telescoped picture of the twenty-kilometres dash back to Vienna in five seconds or so; after this, an empty gap, then a glimpse in the darkened auditorium, of the excited

hush (for a visualizer can see a hush) as Clemens Krauss lifts his baton.

Now in a flash come rakish angle-views of the stage, tantalizing, vague images of my friends, and Baron Ochs struts down, melting annoyingly into Henry VIII, who straddles at the top of the hall of Trinity College, Cambridge. Back to Vienna: a slow, three-four thump, thump heard from the second orchestra, behind the stage, but no word of the Marschallin's lovely monologue, not a note of Strauss's music, for my auditory imagery is as shy as my visual imagery is obtrusive. Not always, for sometimes in dreams and in wakeful moments after a concert, wisps of melody drift through my mind, and when trying to phrase a thought in German, I may image the voice of someone speaking it well.

One's lack of auditory imagery might be undetected by others, since it is possible, for a short time, to talk or write about music by merely visualizing passages written by critics. Visual imagery of the silver rose in *Rosenkavalier*, and of words describing its silver music, might hide from the undiscerning the fact that I cannot remember this music, but only one of its meanings, and that at second-hand.

After such a long self-exhibition it is customary to apologize. I do so, gladly; yet this demonstration may remind readers who think predominantly in words, of the great individual differences in the mental apparatus of those who influence others by writing. Verbalizers sometimes assume that their way of remembering is the only, or the only right one. Yet if a critic praises a passage in a tone-poem because the strings make golden copper sounds, or comments upon an astringent piano tune, his synæsthesia is surely relevant. It should be remembered when estimating his value, either as a judge of music or

as a writer about it. One type of social reformer, speaking or writing of English slums, is chiefly interested in differential rents or index-figures; another cannot shake off the visual image of a rat emerging from the wall, just above a cradled baby. The first type is often called practical, hard-headed; the second, sentimental. Yet in a few minutes the sentimental speaker, broadcasting, may reach ten times as many voters as the statistician's figures would in a lifetime. Mr. J. B. Priestley's child-like literary mind, he tells us in *English Journey*,[1] always fastens upon concrete details. When really grown-up persons, such as economists and bankers and city men, condescend to mention their mysteries, he and a fellow-writer, another simpleton, show a lack of comprehension and seriousness that brings a smile to these solemn faces. And, asking himself what the city has done for its old ally the industrial north, since the financial depression, he replies with an image so lacking in suavity, in polish, in urbanity, so distressingly Yorkshire, that one is a little apprehensive lest a copy of *English Journey* might be carelessly dropped east of Temple Bar.

Are a writer's images, we may ask, from the mind's eye, the mind's ear, limbs, or body? Can some of these visual images, lovely or ugly, solid or misty, really be expressed in the slimmed skeletons of print, or in breathy puffs from a larynx? May not the attempt to "express" visual images in words jag their outlines, cripple, even destroy them?

What is the momentary function of such images? They may symbolize the past, as when one merely reflects upon it. They may offer a mental refuge from a too actual gray sky. As posters, which are possibly the actualization of someone's images, they may even influ-

[1]Pp. 409-12.

ence one's attitude towards a country. Again, the concrete reality of a personal image might prevent one from believing propagandist statements about a nation in general. Finally, the function of images may be, as it is for me now, to support the belief that one's way of remembering affects not only the attitude towards life, but one's way of expressing this attitude in writing, speaking, music, and the arts. If this be true, it may help to explain the difference between a Blake and a Hegel, and may cast at least some light upon the problems of style in writing, and of criticism of that style.

At one time it was suggested that people could be divided into types, visiles, audiles, and motiles. Later investigation showed that few persons, if any, could be placed exclusively in one of these classes; that "mixed" imagery is most usual. Yet to admit this is not to deny the existence of individuals whose imaging, thinking, perhaps even perceiving, is heavily loaded by the excessive influence of vision, hearing, smell, or touch. The declaration that Micawbers, Pecksniffs, and Jingles are never met with in real life was once effectively countered by Professor Stephen Leacock. So it may be true statistically that there is no pure visile, or pure Micawber, but, artistically and practically, it is misleading to ignore that some individuals approach this pure type. Many a visualizer must often read lines which he could never have brought himself to write, because of the contradictory imagery which they evoke. Even some psychologists who doubt the value of imagery in thinking, have by their mixed metaphors innocently provided their visualizing colleagues with amusement.

"Thing-thinkers" can be distinguished from "word-thinkers." The first class, who imagine concretely, use visual, auditory, or motor images. The second class, too,

may remember in any of these three ways, but they employ words instead of things. When the words are represented by imaged movements they may characterize Braille writers and readers, typists, lino-typists, and telegraphists. "Most people," writes Professor Cyril Burt in *How the Mind Works*, "are concrete thinkers, for imagining is easier than verbalising. . . . Children and most uneducated persons think predominantly in realistic terms. Their thoughts are imaginary pictures."

So far, so good; but only so far. Neither Professor Burt nor his contemporary, Mr. Aldous Huxley, would assume that those who think in this way must be either children or uneducated. In *Two or Three Graces*, Mr. Huxley's heroine Grace, besides being petty, self-centred, and unusually repellent, is addicted to visual imagery and even possesses a "number-form," thinking of numbers as localized in different positions in space. In his story, and in a letter which he kindly sent me, Mr. Huxley, as a verbalizer, disclaims special knowledge of Grace's picture-thinking. Unfortunately, others write about imagery with less intuition. Thoughts like these may have occurred to Professor J. C. Flügel, who, discussing Professor Alfred Adler's theory, has recently observed that persons gifted with exceptionally little insight into the thoughts and motives of their fellows sometimes compensate by choosing to be psychologists. From them, perhaps, one receives the suggestion that visualizers are primitive, still suffering from childish disorders. Before agreeing, one would like to know the type of mental material utilized by the cartoonist Low.

Professor Burt writes sympathetically: "Your mind may be like a silent cinema; mine is more like a broadcast debate, with the voices of conscience, my friends, and myself, all arguing together in the twilight." If all critics

of the visualizer were more like this writer, and less like some natives of industrial towns, who value the smoke-pall since it prevents them from blinking, no great harm would be done. But what if the critics kiss their chains; if philosophers, economists, teachers, and examiners, who have spent their lives in staring at print, guiding ink upon paper, merely know, and do not image, what flowers, blue skies, unemployed areas, hungry children look like, sound like, smell like, and think of them only in words? We cannot assume that they are necessarily less sympathetic. Verbalizers and the imageless thinkers may have voluntarily exchanged benevolence towards individuals for sympathy with a class. They may have been valuably trained to find and grasp the truths under the facts. Yet such education as theirs has too often produced blue-book minds. "Malnutrition" is a word less startling than "underfedness;" and this in its turn sounds more decorous in a committee-room than "half-starvedness." It might help non-visualizing members of committees to meet occasionally in a room hung with pictures of the people for whom they are legislating.

Together with a tendency to think in shorthand there often grows up an inability to express one's beliefs to any but a limited circle of readers or hearers. Recognition by the expert of his impotence is by no means always a matter for shame. It is often accompanied by contempt for those outside that circle. The opinion that things ought not to be made too easy for the reader or listener, held by many who have teaching posts and by some mental narcissists, may make them disdain to vouchsafe a single concrete example in many pages of abstract statements. This style is sometimes called scholarly. In *La tâche de notre temps*, José Ortega y Gasset compares imagery to an instrument, once necessary for the creation, but never

subsequently liquidated. It lingers on, like a sponge sewn up by an absent-minded surgeon in the patient's body. All our other mental abilities, he believes, maintain us in the real, the present. There remain, however, the floating islands, the reefs of the imagination: images. Apparently, it takes an image to attack an image. This may be just and right, as if an armament-maker should receive the attentions of his own shells.

Galton's *Inquiry into Human Faculty* provided an early stimulus to the tendency to depreciate imagery. And this is odd, because Galton had a wide-ranging curiosity. As Flügel writes in *A Hundred Years of Psychology*, "From fashions to finger-prints, from the geographical distribution of female beauty to the application of statistics to prize-giving, from weight-lifting to the future of the race, nothing lacked interest to this ingenious, versatile and all-inquiring mind." Yet one object which Galton seldom investigated was the ordinary human mind. His subjects were human enough, but since in England, half a century ago, they were Galton's friends, their minds were not ordinary. John Galsworthy has explained why.

Galton asked his subjects to describe their recollections of a breakfast-table, noting colours and other details. The questionnaire was addressed to scientific men, "the most likely class . . . to give accurate answers." To-day as a result of his work, we know that for visual imagery Galton went to the wrong people. "The great majority protested that mental imagery was unknown to them." One member "suggested that some fallacy must underlie the whole investigation." Yet, if you asked the same question of a dozen ordinary working people, not a few would give just that answer which, to his surprise, Galton did not get. Some scientists did image concretely, but they were seldom men who had occupied themselves for

years with abstract thinking. Among such thinkers the gift of imagery might appear to have atrophied. This explanation, though sometimes confidently proposed, is too simple. For example, the psychologist Dr. W. H. R. Rivers in later life would have believed that he had lost the power of concrete imagery, had he not experienced it in dreams and in attacks of malaria. Looking through a collection of personal letters about imagery, I note that a philosopher and a novelist, both living and famous, are visited by visual images when their temperature rises. From this clinical fact, inferences are tempting but unjustified, concerning the effect of such a bodily change upon the matter or manner of their writing. Yet "abstract thinking" is too vague a term. Perhaps the nineteenth-century natural-scientist's type of thinking may be specially significant in this connection. Some of Galton's scientist friends had been intensively trained to avoid consideration of their mental workings and of the possibility that other minds might be different. As Professor Wolfgang Köhler gently remarks in *Gestalt Psychology*, "All the difficulties of psychologists who try to observe and describe subjective experiences are simply avoided by the physical sciences." So the scientists' answers may have been accurate as far as they went: it was not a great distance.

The almost negative result might have suggested the value of investigating non-scientists. Apparently, at the time, it did not, but this was fifty years ago. Recently, some writers who have brilliantly demonstrated their unusual mastery over words, insist that visual imagery is valuable. Miss Victoria Sackville-West writes, in *Passenger to Teheran*:

> It may be that language, that distorted labyrinthine universe, was never designed to replace or even to compete with the

> much simpler functions of the eye. We look; and there is the image . . . tri-dimensional, instantaneous. Language follows . . . and after five pages of print succeeds in reproducing but a fraction of the registered vision.

She further refers to

> the strange world-within-the-world that we have created by this habit of language . . . [so] that we are no longer capable of imagining life without it. At one moment it seems that there is nothing . . . that may not be expressed in words, down to the finest stroke of a Proust or a Henry James: next moment we recognise in despair . . . our incapacity truly to communicate to one another the simplest experience of our factual or emotional life.

Miss Sackville-West is thinking primarily of objects actually seen, though the last sentence suggests that both visual imagery and visual perception were in her mind. Visual imagery appears to be contemned by abstract thinkers. Yet, at least until recently, one could question whether an abstract, general, quasi-mathematical statistical view of life was necessarily the truest, the most real, the most important. To William James it was not. In his *Psychology*[2] he writes:

> But truly in comparison with the wonderful fact that our thoughts, however different otherwise, can still be of the same, the question whether that same be a single thing, a whole thing, a whole class of things, an abstract quality or something unimaginable is an insignificant matter of detail. Our meanings are of singulars, particulars, indefinites, problematics, and universals, mixed together in every way. A singular individual is as much conceived when he is isolated and identified away from the rest of the world in my mind, as is the most rarefied and universally applicable quality he may possess—being, for example, when treated in the same way. From every point of view the overwhelming and portentous character

[2] *Briefer Course*, p. 240.

> ascribed to universal conceptions is surprising. Why, from Socrates downwards, philosophers should have vied with each other in scorn of the knowledge of the particular and in adoration of that of the general, is hard to understand, seeing that the more adorable knowledge ought to be that of the more adorable things, and that the things of worth are all concretes and singulars.

The visualizer and verbalizer may regard as supremely important quite different aspects of the universe. Their way of writing may express, or even, by a key-word, betray their peculiarity. If, in composing, the author is dominated by the imaged sounds of words, he will write beautiful phrases, but he may also be tempted to reject uncouth or inelegant words even though they and no others exactly express his meaning. The rejection, if he has been trained in scientific thinking, ought to cause him a pang of conscience. Yet, while composing, he may decline to spoil the swagger or the swing of a sentence by hanging it about with niggling if's and but's. In this way, one kind of philosophical writer, putting the old simple words, the soul, the mind, the will, the good, in the old simple order, will write pellucidly about nothing. Or despising concrete examples, the verbalizer may write books, which few read, about exciting, even tragic subjects. Some of those who read them tell you, years afterwards, that all they remember is one concrete example. A few psychologists write gaily of the "verbalization" of visual, even of visceral, experience, as if between these types of mental events there yawned no gulf. Such writers, presumably, are seldom visualizers.

A psychologist, himself not a visualizer, who has written with unusual insight about this gulf is Professor F. C. Bartlett. In *Remembering*, he suggests that images exert their most important functions in the realm between

perceptual response to an existing situation and the bare use of descriptive words.

This statement is so condensed that it may help the reader, as it helped me, to illustrate it by an example. The sun, pelting upon a gleaming icy shoulder of the Jungfrau, may astound, dazzle, pain, excite, and exalt one who sees it at close quarters. These clumsy "sentimental" words are the best I can find at the moment to describe an event which happened. But to use them may imply wrongly that the aspects of experience which they signify were separable. One cannot, though a dreamer or James Joyce might, condense these words to express the fused experience. To find words at all for this experience is to cheapen it. One does so with a bad grace. It is like selling an heirloom if one is not poor: the money raised by "realizing" the valuable is not necessarily more real, more beautiful, or more desirable. So a visualizer resents the assumption that until his visual image has been "verbalized" it has little value. His attitude will be stiffened if he reflects that the comparison of one image with another may be direct, resulting in a definite non-verbal conclusion. A visualizer may compare the presentation of the same character in the original novel with that in a stage-play, a silent film, and a sound film, subsequently made from it. One series of visual images may be compared with another, but to express the result in words might seem pretentious, crude, and certainly uncalled for. Visual images may live private lives, not asking for expression.

What then is the relation between image and meaning? "There is an image," writes Professor Bartlett, "and meaning has to be tacked on to that, or, perhaps more accurately, has to flow out of it or emerge from it before words can carry the process further." This sentence

offers so many challenges to a visualizer that it might almost have been written provocatively. "Tacked on to" evoked an image of the stuffy dress-making room in *La Bohème* and a feeling of indignation, by no means merely tacked on to that image, at such an unsuitable verb. "Flow out of" seemed better, since the efflux may cause a qualitative and affective loss in the image. "Emerge from" is a phrase at present in favour, but perhaps more satisfying to non-visualizers. Though at present I can find no better words, I do not like Professor Bartlett's. He continues:

> So the course of description, when images abound, is apt to be more exciting, more varied, more rich, more jerky, and from a merely logical point of view, a little more difficult to follow than when meaning flows directly into words. Also, and this too is a matter of the greatest psychological interest, it is less subject to convention and is apt to appear more definitely original. Images are, in fact, so much a concern of the individual that, as everybody knows, whenever in psychological circles a discussion about images begins, it very soon tends to become a series of autobiographical confessions.

Acknowledging with approval the hint that behaviourists who do not discuss images may not be psychologists, and substituting "is" for "apt to appear," I would point out the psychological interest, in this context, of the word "confessions." The differences between minds are not merely to be confessed to a priest or a psycho-analyst: they are the proper material for psychologists. One reason why imagers talk about imagery is that its phenomena are so varied, so numerous, and so widely ignored. In *Remembering*, for example, eidetic imagery is not mentioned, nor are hallucinations, dreams, or "coloured-hearing." It may be irksome, it may disarrange a theoretical scheme to read detailed accounts of individual

differences in imagery. It might be similarly disturbing for an anatomist to read of a new animal, but its discoverer would hardly feel called upon to confess that he had found it.

Professor Bartlett regards the image as "a device for picking bits out of schemes, for increasing the chance of variability in the reconstruction of past stimuli and situations, for surmounting the chronology of presentations." "The image facilitates the operation of the past in relation to the somewhat changed conditions of the present." This describes the image's function in a process which Bartlett defines as thinking: the utilization of the past in the solution of difficulties set by the present. He apparently refers to one type of thinking. It might, perhaps, be called "thinking-out," as distinct from "thinking-of," something. Thinking-out, in a limited number of its aspects, is aided by the technique of scientific thinking. Professor Bartlett seems to be dominated by the ideal of scientific thinking. Yet poets, artists, and musicians think, and some of them think little of, as well as about, certain developments of modern science. Mr. Robert Graves is one. In letters to me he has protested against the view that imagery is or may be merely the vehicle of thinking, that dream-life is necessarily inferior to waking-life, and that imaging and thinking form a continuum in which sharp discriminations are possible. Perhaps the thought-patterns of his surroundings are not those of Cambridge. Professor Bartlett, of course, is cognisant of such views. He writes that "the position and the main justification of the image are given by its affective character." Yet, again, the north-east wind from over the fens buffets one's cheek as he adds, "It almost seems as if images merely provide a kind of aesthetic luxury." At

this point, however, unverbalizable images arise in one reader's mind.

There are many further valuable suggestions in Professor Bartlett's book. Two only can be indicated here. He claims that "words and sensorial images are comparable in one sense: they deal with situations at a distance. But words are social, and therefore distinguished from sensorial images." Is this quite so simple? Words are completely social between equals, but only partly so between speakers of different educational or national status. This becomes very clear if one studies the different words, phrases, intonations, and speech-melodies used in America and England respectively when apologizing for a slight breach of manners. Secondly, he writes: "Thinking [out] has its drawbacks; as it ages, it loses vivacity, variety. The instruments which it uses are words which, because they are social and strung out in sequence, drop into habit-reactions even more readily than images do. Yet this method remains the method of rationalisation and inference." But, ask the imagers, how can we get the non-verbalizer to think? The cinema is a possibility, though *Kameradschaft* and *The Sign of the Cross* would lead his mind along very different paths. Dr. Otto Neurath's pictorial statistics from the Vienna *Mundaneum* have bridged the gap, but these little pictures can be made to imply much more or less than the truth.

This article is about to end, as I feared it would, in a string of questions; it is possible that in asking them I shall flout all canons of style. If, in the near future, script-production for the radio, the talking-film, and television are to be taken seriously by writers, will not visualizers be wanted? Will they not try to write faithful scripts of colloquial speech for play, radio-talk, or conver-

sation, to evoke images? Then, who to-day is qualified to criticize their work? Can the usual type of literary critic judge such attempts? What will his criticism be worth if he adheres tightly to the present criteria of style in writing?

GREAT BRITAIN, 1910-1935

EDGAR MCINNIS

IT IS natural that a Royal Jubilee should be a time of retrospect. It is especially natural that such a celebration, descending upon us at a time which offers few obvious reasons for rejoicing in the present or confidence in the future, should move us to cast a backward glance at a quarter-century which, if it was not glorious, was at least colourful and eventful in an unusual degree. And because this was to be expected, it has perhaps escaped attention that the flood of articles and publications on this special occasion does not represent an interest newly awakened or suddenly evoked. Rather it accentuates a tendency, steadily growing during the past few years, to look back upon the present reign as the close of a definite historical period, and to treat it as part of an era which, if not already over, is certainly close to its end.*

The roots of this period go back far beyond the accession of George V. They may be traced at least as far as the eighteen-seventies. One might say—with a cautious sidelong glance at the economists—that from those years of depression dates the second major phase of the industrial revolution. The technique of machine production has been established. The transition from an agricultural to an industrial basis has been effected and accepted. The salient anachronisms which hampered that transition have been abolished. But the problems

*_The King's Grace, 1910-1935_, by John Buchan, Hodder and Stoughton (Musson Book Company).
The Reign of King George the Fifth, by D. C. Somervell, Faber and Faber.
A Short History of Our Times, by J. A. Spender, Cassell.
These Hurrying Years, by Gerald Heard, Chatto and Windus.

presented by the new national economy have still to e solved, and their full nature is at last becoming forcibly apparent. It is the search for a solution that forms the theme of the succeeding period.

The new king came to the throne just as the struggle for readjustment was reaching a climax. The first false dawn, manifested in the "Unauthorized Programme" of Joseph Chamberlain, had been blotted out by the crisis over Home Rule. By the time Queen Victoria died, a new movement was in the making. It burst forth under Edward, gathering impetus as the new Liberal government plunged into the task of making up the arrears of two decades. As the programme of reform grew more and more sweeping, resistance stiffened. When George V succeeded his father (prematurely christened the Peacemaker) he inherited a conflict that had been joined all along the lines.

Its manifestations were varied. Education and the Established Church, women's suffrage and old age pensions, birth control and the Borstal system—all these were matters of fierce controversy as the effort to adjust the social lag ran headlong into established institutions and vested interests. The reformers felt that they could wait no longer. The Old Guard would neither die nor surrender. And in the constitutional issue which faced the new king at the outset of his reign, all the other issues were summed up.

The root of the matter was the growing self-consciousness of the working class. This class, made articulate by the second and third Reform Acts, still lingered before the citadel of political power, uncertain whether to crash the gates or to wait patiently until they opened of their own accord. But behind their indecision was a potential menace growing more and more alarming.

The new industrial unions were moving toward a vast concentration of forces which threatened to place the whole industrial life of the nation, and perhaps the government as well, at the mercy of these bodies. The entry of labour into the political sphere had met with a success which, though distinctly limited, was enough to be disturbing. It is true that labour was still far from socialistic. It did not want to transform either the political or the economic system; it merely wanted certain concessions to its own specific interests. But the power behind these demands made it advisable to give them good heed.

The Liberal party especially took them to heart. The Conservatives, after some wistful contemplation of the beauty of reconciling paternalism and property, had ended by making a few half-hearted gestures and letting it go at that. By clinging to property they felt they could still survive. For the Liberals the situation was different. Property was deserting them for a safer refuge under the Conservative banner. The old Gladstonian creed, without Gladstone's preaching to lend it hypnotic glamour, was rousing less and less enthusiasm among the working classes. An extension of equalitarian doctrines from the political to the economic sphere, and the substitution of paternalism for *laissez-faire*, were essential if the fortunes of the party were to be revived. Asquith and his associates made wry faces at this prescription; but they swallowed it at the hands of Lloyd George, and the party embarked upon a comprehensive programme of social readjustment.

This programme involved fundamental changes in the relations between the state and the individual. Among other things, it seriously infringed upon the rights of private ownership. The new measures were, mildly

and tentatively, a form of redistribution of wealth. They called for something more than ordinary taxation—something which, in the eyes of the possessors of wealth, was nothing less than confiscation. The threatened classes retired into their constitutional stronghold and barred the doors. It was a privileged position of which they were determined to take full advantage, and while they retained possession they could hold up all change indefinitely. It was significant that the Liberals, setting out with the avowed intention of destroying this stronghold, contented themselves in the end with merely breaking the lock.

This outrage, however, embodied in the Parliament Act, was too great to be forgiven. Not only were the defences still stubbornly manned; the defenders were now ready, if need be, to abandon parliamentary methods and undertake armed warfare in grim earnest. Their opponents had used constitutional means to change the constitution. The Conservatives, no longer secure in a privileged position, showed themselves ready to repudiate the constitution altogether, sooner than surrender interests which they regarded as vital. The Ulster crisis left no doubt of this. "I can imagine," said Bonar Law, "no length of resistance to which Ulster will go in which I shall not be ready to support her." It was in effect a summons to his followers to defend their essential position even at the price of civil war.

While the effort at readjustment in home affairs was moving toward this ultimate deadlock, a similar effort in foreign affairs was leading toward Armageddon. By the beginning of the century it could be seen that the spacious days of Cobdenism were over. England no longer stood alone and unchallenged as the workshop of the world. The markets in which her products had once

found grateful acceptance were now being closed against her as they developed domestic industries of their own, or were being invaded and even annexed by rivals who had sprung up within the past half-century. Free trade no longer offered a universal passport. Colonial competition changed the aspect of colonies from millstones to lodestones. Worst of all, the growth of international trade, far from ushering in an era of peace and disarmament, was accompanied by a universal armament race which could end only in an explosion.

Moreover, danger again threatened those interests which for hundreds of years England has consistently defended. Her trade supremacy, her colonial supremacy, her naval supremacy—an almost inseparable trinity—were in jeopardy, and with them the security of her Channel coasts and the stability of the balance of power. Various nations menaced one or other of these interests; Germany alone endangered them all. So Britain sought friends among Germany's enemies; and by 1910 she was more deeply committed to these friends than most cabinet ministers knew, or than those who knew would admit. The next three years saw a steadily increasing estrangement from Germany. In 1914 there seemed to be a check to this process and a tentative effort to remove some of the difficulties. But it was too late to reverse the trend, and the mutual distrust and rivalry between the two countries plunged them into the chaos toward which they had been moving for a decade.

II

For some countries, especially the vanquished, the War was a decisive episode. For Britain it was not. It removed the specific menace of imperial Germany, but it is doubtful whether even this improved her general

position; for here was a war which everybody lost. And though it may have hastened some items of readjustment or retarded others, it did not in general break the main trend which characterized the earlier years of the reign.

A comparison of the problems confronting England in 1935 with those she faced in 1910 marks the extent of the march toward surrender. Some of the most fiercely contested issues have dropped out completely. Women's suffrage has long since been granted, and no notable disaster has followed. The Irish question has been eliminated as a persistent and disruptive issue in English politics and has been merged in the broader imperial problem. But other questions remain, holding grave possibilities of bitter conflict and even of revolutionary change.

The imperial position itself has notably altered. Here was a case where the War accentuated a tendency already in progress. The early illusion that the War had increased imperial unity has been dissipated by subsequent events. The hope for continuous consultation and concerted action has long since vanished. Even the binding force of the common crown has been gravely weakened by recent legislation in South Africa and the Irish Free State. Political federation, the dream of Chamberlain and his disciples, has faded beyond recall, and with it has gone even the idea of a strong union for imperial defence. Efforts are still being made to revive it; but the breakdown of the conception of a common foreign policy has almost certainly removed the essential foundation for such a union. The conception of a commonwealth of nations begins to look like a contradiction in terms.

Even in the sphere of imperial trade the advance is more apparent than real. The neo-mercantilism of

Chamberlain aimed at securing a privileged position in colonial markets by offering privileges in return. The price, represented by the substitution of protection for free trade, was one which the England of 1910 declined to pay. Balancing the reality of dwindling markets abroad against the prospect of an increased cost of living at home, the bulk of the nation refused to accept what appeared to be certain sacrifices in return for doubtful gains. That refusal has at last been overcome, but the results from an imperial point of view, as represented by the Ottawa agreements, remain doubtful. England may find that the bargaining position which she has achieved by the adoption of tariffs can be used at least as successfully outside as within the Empire. And though a more vigorous imperialism may indeed provide a partial answer to her economic problems, its field will be the backward colonies rather than the self-governing dominions.

In this sphere the balance is still uncertain. The consolidation of Britain's African possessions—so revealingly described by Professor Coupland in the October number of the QUARTERLY—has clearly improved her position. But against this must be set the weakening control over other portions of the Empire, and, above all, over India. When George V came to the throne the Morley-Minto reforms had been introduced, and had been met with acquiescence, if not with enthusiasm, in India itself. To-day a proposal for a wide measure of self-government, which twenty years ago would have roused an outburst of gratitude and loyalty, has encountered violent protests from almost every important section of Indian opinion. Here is a clear case of failure to adjust the growing conflict of interests within the imperial system itself; and as that failure continues,

in spite of persistent efforts, the fringes of the Empire move, it would seem, towards disintegration.

At the same time Britain's world position, with which her imperial position is so closely bound up, has also been weakened. The failure to regain a definite trade supremacy, and the limited recovery of colonial predominance, have been crowned by the surrender of the mastery of the seas. Before the War that mastery was still a reality in spite of the threat from Germany. To-day it is shared by the United States and Japan. The result is an alteration of Britain's whole position, especially in the Pacific. In that area her trade and her colonies are at the mercy of Japan, and she remains on sufferance until that nation, choosing her own time, issues notice to quit to all absentee proprietors. And unless in the meantime Japan's headlong course involves her in irretrievable disaster, it is hard to see how such action can be resisted without risking a major cataclysm.

The European situation is hardly more hopeful. It is true that Britain no longer feels every vital interest menaced by the solid bloc of Central Europe. But Nazi Germany may yet prove at least as disturbing as the Hohenzollern Empire; and other post-War changes are of doubtful advantage to Britain. Russia is under a régime more fundamentally antagonistic to British interests than even the old Czarist imperialism. Italy occupies a position in international affairs such as she never enjoyed before the War, and her ties with Britain are badly frayed. The peoples of Europe have turned from their admiration of British democracy to follow after strange gods; and though France remains a parliamentary state, her present course in foreign affairs gives little comfort to a nation which must pay for her friendship by being dragged at her chariot wheels. The War

destroyed Britain's immediate enemy, but it failed to restore to her either security or independence.

But important as these developments are, it is the progress of readjustment in home affairs that still preoccupies the nation; and here the major questions, already posed at the beginning of the reign, remain unanswered even to-day. Some surface adjustments have already made substantial progress, especially in fields where Britain's fund of experience can still be counted as an asset. Her knowledge of international finance may enable London to regain the position she lost to New York during the War, and to become once more the money market of the world. The shift to the newer industries which have sprung up in the south of England may partially offset the decline in coal and cotton and steel, those pillars of pre-War economy. But while finance may aid in forming trade connections and tariffs may preserve the home market from the foreigner, neither can hold for Britain her essential foreign markets against the sort of drive that Japan has put on during the past three years. In the end she may have to reshape her whole economy to take far less account of the foreign trade on which her prosperity has hitherto been built.

The deeper question of the social and political implications of this situation still remains unsolved. For a time it seemed that the War would hasten a solution. The growing labour unrest, the adoption of a definite Socialist platform by the Labour party, the rise of that party to displace the Liberals as the chief rivals of the Conservatives, all seemed to foreshadow an early and decisive clash on the question of Britain's future path. Such a clash has not yet come about—for, in the opinion of the present writer, there was nothing ultimately

decisive either in the defeat of the general strike or the triumphant issue of the National government from the crisis of 1931.

Part of the reason for this is no doubt to be found in a new readiness on the part of the Conservatives to undertake social legislation while still standing as a bulwark in defence of the principle of private ownership. But a more adequate explanation may be found in the tendency of Labour leaders to talk like Socialists when in opposition and to act like Conservatives when in power. This combination has accelerated the progress of minor readjustments while delaying a clash over the fundamental basis of the state. And just as the Home Rule crisis delayed the Radical programme for twenty years, so the crisis of 1931 may have dealt political Labour a blow from which it will not recover until it has been completely transformed.

But however the political alignment may change, the fundamental issues remain. It is conceivable that time may permit the working out of a compromise, based on paternalism, which will content the bulk of the nation, yet remain compatible with the basic principle of private ownership. Failing this possibility, a decisive test is inescapable. It will come when any substantial body of the people decides that the sacrifices which the state demands are greater than the benefits it offers, and that they can be saved only by refashioning the state to make it more amenable to their own control. In such a situation the monarchy itself might be put to the test; indeed, the personality and policy of the monarch might even be the decisive factor. But in that case he could no longer remain the ideal sovereign whom Mr. Buchan extols as having "no party bias, for his only bias is toward the whole people." And among the prayers

that go up for King George on the occasion of his Jubilee, there might well be one that he will never have to face such a crisis during his life-time.

III

The present reign, then, has seen a process of change affecting the nature and position of the Empire and challenging the future of the state. It is not to be expected that the forces which produced these changes in the political organization should be without effect upon the people who compose it. It is not only a different Empire over which the king rules; it is a different people, whose nature and outlook have been profoundly affected by this progress toward a brave new world.

There are obvious examples which spring to mind at once. Only the year before the reign opened, the first aeroplane flew across the English Channel. To-day there are air lines linking London with Cape Town and Delhi and Sydney, and Britain's frontier has moved from the Channel to the Rhine. The new marvel of wireless telegraphy has long since become commonplace as radio moves rapidly toward the goal of television. The infant cinema and the incalculable motor-car have ceased to be mere toys or even luxuries and have become essential parts of the structure of civilization.

These are the tangible things. Behind them are the developments of scientific research whose results, not yet fully assimilated by the public consciousness, continue to deal shattering blows to the external world as the Edwardians knew it. The average man may not feel directly affected by the theories of Einstein or the discoveries of Rutherford. He may not change his daily habits because of new light on the structure of the atom or the working of the endocrine glands. Yet

surely and inevitably such things, affecting our picture of the world about us and our conception of man's own nature, are bound to give rise to modes of thought and action quite different from those of a past generation.

In the cultural as in the political sphere, however, the adjustment takes place only slowly. One can see a groping toward it in the efforts of architecture to emancipate itself from a false romanticism and achieve a functional form, or in the tendency of painting and sculpture to abandon the pictorial in favour of the representational. But the phase is still an experimental one; and in the field of literature the new spirit is still seeking vainly for a body.

Here one feels the lack of an accepted directive. The writers who dominated the pre-War scene were not only keenly interested in contemporary problems; they had also certain basic ideas to guide them in their approach. The implications of Darwinism had by this time pervaded the whole sphere of thought. No doubt its effects were only imperfectly apparent in the exotic romances of Conrad or the reportorial minuteness of Bennett. But it is no far cry from its underlying philosophy to that of Hardy or Wells or Shaw—the men who, as the period recedes into perspective, are more and more established as its significant figures.

To-day the Darwinian view, though it retains its central importance, is being modified in both its premises and conclusions. Science itself is becoming increasingly conscious of its own ignorance and beginning to question the mechanistic outlook which it once accepted; and its questions are finding their echo in the wider intellectual sphere. There have arisen, too, other interpreters of life to trouble the waters of thought. The work of Freud and his disciples has had a profound

effect on the whole modern outlook. And more slowly, the Marxian diagnosis of industrial civilization is pervading the approach to the problems of the modern world.

It is, of course, too early to say what figures may emerge in contemporary literature to take the place of those who are passing. Yet it would not be surprising if the vein they represented has come to a full stop, as the sweet singing of Brooke and the Georgians has given place to the acrid bitterness of *The Waste Land*. The theatre which Shaw so largely helped to create has outrun the Shavian mannerisms; and, in spite of the hero of *Cakes and Ale*, the passing of Hardy has left no undisputed successor to his literary throne.

Already, however, there is vigorous evidence of a new departure. To mention Joyce alone is to indicate an influence whose full importance it is still too early to assess, but whose significance in the historical sense is already beyond dispute. And among the novelists whose works had a larger access to the general reading public, both D. H. Lawrence and Aldous Huxley stand out as prophets of a new point of view who have made fiction the medium for an intellectual impact at once provocative and disturbing.

These are, of course, distinctive figures who stand apart from the main current of contemporary English fiction, in which the general tendency is less to face the future than to turn back and analyse the past. *Point Counter Point* is less typical than *The Forsyte Saga*. The remarkable vogue for realistic or pseudo-realistic biography is only partially due to the mordant charm of Lytton Strachey. It represents this same thing that the Jubilee has emphasized—a sense that a definite period is drawing to a close. And so while the post-War period

in both Germany and the United States saw an active probing by the novelists into the significant phenomena of contemporary life, in England the tendency was rather to turn back and try to trace the path by which the present *impasse* had been reached.

IV

But if there is an *impasse* ahead, it can still be escaped by a change of direction. That, however, is a step which a large portion of the nation is still trying to evade. It is not merely that faith in the older creeds has given way to scepticism and the new creeds are still imperfectly formulated. There is the hard fact that every significant change involves a sacrifice of position on the part of some section of the population, and that those who are called upon to make this surrender are apt to regard it as synonymous with the ruin of the nation itself.

This is no new point of view. It has emerged, to the accompaniment of clamorous outcries, in every major crisis which Britain has confronted in the course of her history. But, as Adam Smith remarked, there is a great deal of ruin in a country. And the fact is that Britain has surmounted each successive crisis by ultimately accepting the necessity for readjustment, and making the new departure a foundation for a new and greater development.

For there is no inevitable ruin involved in the surrender of an untenable position. Paradoxical though it may seem to the classes who bear the brunt of such action, surrender may be a source of new strength rather than the beginning of the end. Britain was not ruined by the loss of the American colonies. She did not go down to disaster because the landed class was forced to

surrender its political privilege in 1832 or its economic privilege in 1846. No one, looking back, will now contend that a grant of Home Rule to Ireland at any point in the nineteenth century would have brought about the collapse of England. And to-day it is far from certain that a discontented India is an asset and not a liability, or that the disintegration of the Commonwealth might not give Britain a greater freedom to follow her true interests, or that a lessened dependence on foreign trade would not immensely strengthen her position in a world where economic nationalism is rampant. A nation does not survive by clinging stubbornly to anachronisms, but by recognizing that the retention of certain things it once valued is no longer compatible with changed conditions, and adjusting its social and political basis to meet the altered circumstances.

The one necessity is that this adjustment should be frank and comprehensive. For the task is not merely to meet the changes which have already taken place, but to develop a flexibility which will permit progressive adjustment to the changes still in progress. The steadily increasing tempo of discovery and invention is such that we are no longer allowed a breathing space. The scientists, with cheerful irresponsibility, continue to shower us with destructive gifts which the social organism must learn to assimilate if they are not to bring it to disaster. For however uncertain the future path may be, one thing is certain—that when the Jubilee of Edward VIII comes round, it will find a very different nation in a very different world.

MILTON, PURITANISM, AND LIBERTY

A. S. P. Woodhouse

In "Puritanism and Liberty," a brief review-article, printed in the Quarterly (IV, pp. 395-404), I indicated some of the conditions under which the contribution of Puritanism to the theory of liberty and democracy was made. In the present article I propose to follow the matter out in the case of Milton, and, by a comparison with Roger Williams, to make clear the reason for Milton's position and for its limitations.

I

The doctrine of Christian liberty, grounded largely on St. Paul, came into new prominence with the Reformation revival of Pauline theology. Luther and Calvin formulated its main significance; and it figures in greater or less degree in most English seventeenth-century statements of Protestant theology, such as the official Westminster Confession of Faith, on the one hand, and the popular *Body of Divinity* by Archbishop Ussher, on the other.[1] In its orthodox interpretation Christian liberty means freedom from the condemnation of the Mosaic Law through faith in Christ. The chief object of the Law was to bring men to a conviction of sin and of the need for a Redeemer. That object attained, it gave place to the Gospel. Under the Law men were in the condition

[1] *Luther's Primary Works*, ed. Wace and Buchheim, 1896, pp. 245-93; Calvin, *Institutes*, III, chap. xix; *The Confession of Faith*, Edinburgh, 1874, pp. 64-71; James Ussher, *A Body of Divinity*, London, 1702, pp. 181 *ff.* Puritan extremists like the author of the *Power of Love*, 1643, could complain, however, that Christian liberty was insufficiently emphasized "in public catechisms, books, and sermons" (p. 22; *Tracts on Liberty*, ed. Haller, 1934, II, p. 289).

of children or servants. Under the Gospel believers are raised to the status of sons, joint heirs with Christ, priests (as Luther asserts) and kings. Freed from the oppression of the Law, they voluntarily obey the will of God, substituting an ideal of love, faith, and free activity for meticulous conformity to a complicated code, largely prohibitory in character—the spirit for the mere letter. Thus they enter into Christian liberty. The revolutionary potentialities of the doctrine turn in large measure on the degree to which the Gospel is held to have abrogated the Law. The orthodox view was as follows. In so far as the Law was merely ceremonial it was "typical," foreshadowing the coming of Christ, and was wholly abrogated thereby. In its judicial and political aspects the Law might not be binding on Christians, but Israel still furnished the best of all models for a commonwealth. In its moral aspect orthodox Protestantism allowed of no abrogation of the Law, for (as Ussher stated it) the "Moral Law or Law of Nature [was] engraven by God himself in the heart of man [and] after in tables of stone in the days of Moses." Christian liberty is at the opposite pole from licence. It means freedom from slavery to self and sin, through acceptance of a higher service: in the words of the Prayer Book, God's service is perfect freedom. This is one of the great paradoxical truths in which Christianity is so fertile (and of which no century was more acutely appreciative than the seventeenth). The similarity of the Stoic idea that only the wise man (who has gained a victory over himself) is truly free, has not escaped notice; and indeed Seneca seems to speak the very language of the Liturgy: *Deo parere libertas est.* Christian liberty, to adopt the terminology of a later day, is an inward freedom achieved through the resolution of conflicts on a religious plane.

In Milton these nobler aspects of the doctrine are not without importance, but in the Puritans in general it is the more revolutionary aspects that are chiefly in evidence. Alone or in combination with other Puritan doctrines, the idea of Christian liberty issued in seventeenth-century England in four practical results. (1) Most important, it became the basis, in greater or less degree, of the Independents' demand for liberty of conscience: urged on various grounds, this was claimed, in the last analysis, as part of the Christian's birthright. (2) The doctrine was, however, capable of wider application: it had played its part in the revolt against Rome, and now it fostered, and was on occasion invoked to justify, active rebellion against tyranny both ecclesiastical and political. (3) But the demand for liberty, when attended by some measure of success, constantly merges in a demand for power. This the Puritan revolution illustrates. In discussing Christian liberty Luther had declared that "a Christian man is the most free lord of all and subject to none;" and popular Calvinism always emphasized the special privileges and duties of the Elect —of the Saints as the Puritans delighted to call themselves. True, both Luther and Calvin declared by way of reservation that the liberty, privilege, and power conferred by the Gospel, were wholly spiritual and without application in the political sphere. But reservations have a way of being forgotten; and a part of their teaching coalesced with the millenarianism, widespread in the seventeenth century, to produce the Fifth-Monarchy platform, the rule of the Saints. (4) Finally, another misreading of the doctrine of Christian liberty issued in a revival of Antinomianism, which assumed the abrogation of the Moral as well as the Ceremonial Law, and which sometimes discarded the Old Testament altogether

as merely "typical" and wholly superseded by the New.[2] The revival of Antinomianism is no doubt an attempt to "rationalize" a purely instinctive revolt against those moral rigors of Puritanism illustrated in the Presbyterians but extending beyond them.[3]

Milton's first important reference to Christian liberty belongs to the year 1642 when he is writing in support of a Presbyterian reformation.[4] His complete exposition of the doctrine occurs in the *De Doctrina Christiana*, probably completed some twenty years later.[5] Between these two dates he has invoked the doctrine repeatedly in his campaign for liberty, religious, domestic (or individual), and civil.[6] Here we must confine ourselves to its bearing in the ecclesiastical and political fields. But we must remember (though the matter cannot be dis-

[2]Edwards reports the beliefs "that the Moral Law is of no use at all to believers, that 'tis no rule for believers to walk by nor to examine their lives by, and that Christians are free from the mandatory power of the Law" (*Gangraena*, 1645, pt. i, no. 66); and again "that the scriptures of the Old Testament do not concern or bind Christians now under the New Testament . . . and hereupon some of them do not bind the Old Testament with the New nor read it" (*ibid.*, pt. i, no. 7).

[3]"Seeing that sort of men who follow Anabaptism, Familism, Antinomianism, and other fanatic dreams (if we understand them not amiss), be such most commonly as are by nature addicted to religion, of life also not debauched, and that their opinions having full swing do end in satisfaction of the flesh; it may be come with reason into the thoughts of a wise man whether all this proceed not partly, if not chiefly, from the restraint of some lawful liberty . . . as by physic we learn . . . where nature's current hath been stopped that the suffocation and upward forcing of some lower part affects the head and inward sense with dotage and idle fancies. . . . This may be worth the study of skilful men in theology and the reason of things" (Milton, *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, *Prose Works*, Bohn ed., III, p. 213; this edition hereafter referred to as *P.W.*).

[4]*The Reason of Church Government* (*P.W.*, II, pp. 449 *ff.*, 503-4).

[5]Professor J. H. Hanford's dating (*Studies in Philology*, XVII, pp. 309-19). I expect to discuss this matter and the relation of the *De Doctrina* to Milton's other writings, in a review of the new Columbia edition, to appear in a subsequent issue. M. Saurat, alone among Milton's critics, seeks to establish a relation between Milton's views on Christian liberty and his general conception of liberty; see Denis Saurat, *Milton, Man and Thinker*, 1924, p. 181.

[6]*Second Defence* (*P.W.*, I, p. 258).

cussed) that Christian liberty, which means the freedom of the individual believer achieved through faith in Christ, has a very special bearing on Milton's efforts for individual liberty;[7] and indeed his threefold division tends to break down, for everywhere his concern is for the liberty of the individual and all his pleas for liberty are grounded, in greater or less degree, in religious considerations. It is unnecessary to suppose that the full doctrine as expounded in the *De Doctrina* is implied in Milton's earliest references to Christian liberty. To the idea he returns again and again, and no doubt it develops with his maturing thought.

In the *De Doctrina* he insists that "constraint and bondage [are] as inseparable from the dispensation of the Law as liberty from the dispensation of the Gospel,"[8] dismisses the precepts of the Mosaic Law as "the weak and servile rudiments of this elementary institution,"[9] and declares, "From the abrogation . . . of the law of servitude results Christian liberty."[10] He is consciously revolutionary[11] in maintaining that by the Gospel "the entire Mosaic Law was abolished" and the believer "absolved from subjection to the decalogue as fully as

[7] In *The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce* it becomes the basis of Milton's protracted examination of scripture, continued in the *Tetrachordon*. The Gospel, he maintains, cannot impose a burden unknown to the Law. If it appears to do so, the words of the New Testament must have been misinterpreted, and must be examined anew. The *Areopagitica* (which is classed by Milton among the works on individual liberty) is also in one aspect a treatise on toleration, a protest against "crowding free consciences and Christian liberties into canons and precepts of men" (*P.W.*, II, p. 92). If space permitted it would be easy to show that the influence of the idea of Christian liberty here extends itself from the religious issue to Milton's first formulation of the ethics later to be elaborated in *Paradise Lost*.

[8] *Christian Doctrine* (Bishop Sumner's translation, *P.W.*, IV, p. 397).

[9] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 379.

[10] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 398.

[11] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 395.

from the rest of the Law."[12] The rule of the Mosaic Law is replaced by an inward law of faith and love "written by the Spirit in the hearts of believers."[13] Some affinity with the Antinomians is plain to read here, and some affinity also with the Quaker doctrine of the "inner light." The chapters are almost wholly theoretical; but one detects an impatience of outward restraint very characteristic of Milton, and one catches a momentary glimpse of practical consequences: ". . . we are loosed as it were by enfranchisement through Christ our deliverer . . . from the rule of the Law *and of man* . . .;"[14] in his religion the Christian is "'free from all men,' and consequently from the magistrate in these matters at least."[15]

These revolutionary aspects of Christian liberty are real and influential. But against them must be set two facts: that Milton does not mean by the abrogation of the Mosaic code the abrogation of the fundamental moral law, and that for him the promptings of the Spirit are far from arbitrary and eccentric. The unwritten Law, which, unlike the written, is unabrogable, "is no other than that Law of Nature given originally to Adam, and of which a certain remnant or imperfect illumination still dwells in the hearts of all mankind, which in the regenerate, under the influence of the Holy Spirit, is daily tending towards a renewal of its primitive brightness."[16] It is this inward law whose characters, obscured but not obliterated, the Spirit traces anew in the Christian's heart.

[12] *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 387, 387-97. For this extreme position Milton, subsequently to writing the chapter, finds some support in Zanchius (*ibid.*, IV, p. 395). He had also been anticipated by the author of *The Power of Love*, 1643, pp. 23-4, 39-49 (Haller, II, pp. 290, 298-300), who significantly finds in the doctrine an incentive to the questioning of existing institutions and the revolt against tyranny.

[13] *Christian Doctrine* (*P.W.*, IV, p. 394).

[14] *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 398-9.

[15] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 402.

[16] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 378.

Milton's doctrine is less remote from Ussher's than the preceding paragraph would suggest. It is even closer to that of the Cambridge Platonists, to Whichcote's, for example, with his constant ethical emphasis, as strong as Milton's own, and his predominantly "rationalist" outlook in religion and ethics.

It is the revolutionary aspect of the doctrine, however, which first becomes manifest in Milton's writings. Practically the whole argument from Christian liberty so far as it applies to liberty of conscience is implicit in his pioneer statement of the case in *The Reason of Church Government* (1642), and the path is struck out which is to lead him and others to Independency. During the next six years much occurred to clear and point the argument. The authors of the *Apologetical Narration* indeed left matters somewhat vague, and neither asked for a general toleration in the name of Christian liberty nor denied the magistrate's responsibility for the religious settlement of the nation, thus leading Williams to condemn their position equally with the Assembly's[17] and Edwards to demand a clear answer to the question, "Whether the commanding men by the power of the laws to do their duties, to do the things which God requires of them, with the using outward means to work them to it when unwilling, be unlawful for the magistrate and against Christian liberty, yea or no?"[18] Other Independents answer the question in no uncertain terms: Robinson, Walwyn, and Overton, Milton, Williams, Richardson, and the anonymous authors of *A Paraenetic for Christian Liberty* and *The Ancient Bounds*. By 1647 the reply is so abundantly clear that Edwards turns to a

[17] *Queries of Highest Consideration*, 1644 (*Publications of the Narragansett Club*, ser. 1, II).

[18] Thomas Edwards, *Antapologia*, 1644, p. 301.

rebuttal of the argument from Christian liberty in *The Casting Down of the Last and Strongest Hold of Satan or a Treatise against Toleration and Pretended Liberty of Conscience*, and the *Confession* significantly concludes its chapter on Christian liberty with a declaration that "they who upon pretence of Christian liberty shall oppose any lawful power . . . whether . . . civil or ecclesiastical, resist the ordinance of God," and that whoever disturbs the peace of the church may be proceeded against not only by ecclesiastical censures but by "the power of the civil magistrate."[19] Of the exponents of toleration mentioned, it is Roger Williams who introduces the most striking elaboration of the theme of Law and Gospel. The whole Law (not the ceremonial merely) stands to the Gospel in the relation of type to antitype. The Law is the shadow, the Gospel the substance; the shadow is material, the substance wholly spiritual; and when the substance appears the shadow is void. Thus Williams argues that the Presbyterian ideal of uniformity based on the Old Testament model is contrary to the Gospel, and on the Gospel he grounds his own demand for the absolute separation of church and state and for a general toleration.[20]

[19] *The Confession of Faith*, pp. 70-1. *Cf. Wholesome Severity Reconciled with Christian Liberty*, 1645, attributed to George Gillespie.

[20] *The Bloody Tenent*, ed. Underhill, 1848, pp. 271 *ff*. *Cf. his Queries of Highest Consideration*, pp. 34-5: "We know the allegations against this counsel: the head of all is that from Moses (not Christ) his pattern in the typical land of Israel. . . . We humbly desire it be searched into, and we believe it will be found to be one of Moses' shadows, vanished at the coming of the Lord Jesus: yet such a shadow as is directly opposite to the very testament and coming of the Lord Jesus; opposite to the very nature of a Christian church, the only holy nation and Israel of God; opposite to the very tender bowels of humanity, abhorring to pour out the blood of men merely for their soul's belief and worship; opposite to the very essentials and fundamentals of a civil magistracy, a civil commonweal or combination of men which can only respect civil things; . . . opposite to the civil peace . . . ; opposite to the souls of all men, who by persecution are ravished into a dissembled worship which their souls embrace not; opposite to the best

In *Of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes* Milton bases a similar demand on a related argument, on the abrogation of the Law and the introduction of complete spiritual freedom by the Gospel. This eloquent and fervid passage, a cento of texts bearing on Christian liberty, speaks for itself:

> I have shown that the civil power hath neither right nor can do right by forcing religious things. I will now show the wrong it doth by violating the fundamental privilege of the Gospel, the new birthright of every true believer, Christian liberty: "Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty;" "Jerusalem which is above is free, which is the mother of us all." . . .
>
> For he [Christ] hath not only given us this gift as a special privilege and excellence of his free Gospel above the servile Law, but strictly also hath commanded us to keep it and enjoy it: "You are called to liberty;" . . . "Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage."
>
> Neither is this a mere command, but . . . accompanied with the very weightiest and inmost reasons of Christian religion: "For to this end Christ both died and rose and revived, that he might be Lord both of the dead and the living. . . ." How presumest thou to be his lord, to be whose only Lord, at least in these things, Christ both died and rose and lived again? . . . "Ye are bought with a price: be not made the servants of men." Some trivial price belike and for some frivolous pretences paid in their opinion if—bought and by him redeemed who is God, from what was once the service of God—we shall be enthralled again and forced by men to what now is but the service of men. . . . "Ye are complete in him which is the head of all principality and power;" not completed therefore or made the more religious by those ordinances of

of God's servants, who in all popish and protestant states have been commonly esteemed and persecuted as the only schismatics, heretics, &c.; opposite to that light of scripture which is expected yet to shine, which must by the doctrine be suppressed as a new or old heresy, or novelty. All this in all ages experience testifies, which never saw any long-lived fruit of peace or righteousness to grow upon that fatal tree."

> civil power from which Christ their head hath discharged us, "blotting out the handwriting of ordinances that was against us, which was contrary to us, and took it out of the way, nailing it to his cross." . . . Hence it plainly appears that if we be not free, we are not sons but still servants unadopted; and if we turn again to those weak and beggarly rudiments, we are not free; yea, though willingly and with a misguided conscience we desire to be in bondage to them; how much more then if unwillingly and against our conscience?
>
> Ill was our condition changed from legal to evangelical and small advantage gotten by the Gospel, if for the spirit of adoption to freedom promised us we receive again the spirit of bondage to fear. . . . It will therefore not misbecome the meanest Christian to put in mind Christian magistrates . . . that they meddle not rashly with Christian liberty, the birthright and outward testimony of our adoption, lest, while they . . . think they do God service, they themselves, like the sons of that bondwoman, be found persecuting them who are free-born of the Spirit, and by a sacrilege of not the least aggravation, bereaving them of that sacred liberty which our Saviour with his own blood purchased for them.[21]

From the religious field the principle of Christian liberty extends its influence to the ecclesiastical-political, and even to the political itself:

> . . . Let us consider whether or no the Gospel, that heavenly promulgation of Christian liberty . . . reduce us to a condition of slaves to kings and tyrants, from whose imperious rule even the old Law, that mistress of slavery, discharged the people of God. . . . As he [Christ] gives us grace to submit to a condition of slavery if there be a necessity of it; so if by any honest ways and means we can rid ourselves and obtain our liberty, he is so far from restraining that he encourages us to do so. Hence

[21] *Of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes*, 1659 (*P.W.*, II, pp. 539-42). I have omitted Milton's references for the texts quoted (2 Cor. iii, 17; Gal. iv, 26; v, 13; v, 14; 1 Cor. vii, 23; Col. ii, 10; ii, 14). It is significant that Milton would here deny toleration to Roman Catholics (to whom he is always notably less liberal than Williams) because "of an implicit faith . . . the conscience also becomes implicit, and so by voluntary servitude to man's law forfeits her Christian liberty" (*P.W.*, II, p. 533).

> it is that St. Paul, not only of an evangelical but also of a civil liberty, says: "... Ye are bought with a price; be not ye servants of men."[22]

Like much in the first *Defence* this argument is, of course, quite unsound. It may even be consciously sophistical. But it still has a limited significance; for it embodies a feeling which must have been common in Puritan England and especially among the religious enthusiasts of the Cromwellian Army, many of whom made no nice distinction between the religious and the political spheres. They carried the spiritual fervour of one struggle into the other—led on by prophetic hopes and stimulated by a militant reading of their stern creed. "The kings of this world," says Milton, "have both ever hated and instinctively feared the church of God; whether it be for that their doctrine seems much to favour two things to them so dreadful, liberty and equality, or because they are the children of that kingdom which, as ancient prophecies have foretold, shall in the end break to pieces and dissolve all their great power and dominion."[23] The true force and consistent use of the argument from Christian liberty is, however, totally different. It operates through its logical outcome, the complete separation of church and state. This separation radically alters the character of the state and the sanctions on which its authority depends. For some of the most extreme Puritans it completely secularizes the state and renders a new account of its origin, function, and sanctions necessary, inviting an appeal not to scripture, but to reason and the law of nature, and thus opening the way to the democratic, among other theories, with its emphasis on natural rights and the sovereignty of the

[22] *Defence of the English People* (*P.W.*, I, pp. 60-1).
[23] *Eikonoklastes* (*P.W.*, I, pp. 434).

people. In *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* (1649) and the two *Defences* (1651, 1654) there are echoes of the new democratic theory (strangely mingled with other and discordant sounds!). But it is certain that Milton never fully assimilated the theory, and that for a satisfactory exposition of the new secular state of the extreme Puritans one must turn not to Milton, but to Roger Williams: Milton is radical, but not democratic. Principles which in Williams lead to democracy, in Milton stop short at individualism.

His is a *laissez-faire* state. In the *Second Defence* he explains its functions in the course of an address to Cromwell. It should guarantee the absolute separation of the ecclesiastical and political functions, removing from the church all state support and all power of persecution. It should guarantee complete freedom of discussion. It should provide for a state-supported, but not, of course, a compulsory, system of education—this, apart from the maintenance of order, being the one positive duty assigned to the state. Finally, it will be well,

> since laws are usually worse in proportion as they are more numerous, if you shall not enact so many new laws as you abolish old, which do not operate so much as warnings against evil as impediments in the way of good; and if you shall retain only those which are necessary . . . which, while they prevent the frauds of the wicked, do not prohibit the innocent freedoms of the good, which punish crimes without interdicting those things which are lawful, only on account of the abuses to which they may occasionally be exposed. For the intention of laws is to check the commission of vice, but liberty is the best school of virtue. . . .[24]

Milton adds: "If there be anyone who thinks that this

[24] *P.W.*, I, p. 294. Mr. A. E. Barker reminds me that the extreme position here stated is (as we should expect) absent in Milton's early writings; see *P.W.*, II, pp. 390-1, 439.

is not liberty enough, he appears to me to be rather inflamed with the lust of ambition or of anarchy than with the love of genuine and well-regulated liberty." Positive laws he regards as a necessary evil: their function is wholly negative, to "prevent the frauds of the wicked." Government, Milton held, originated in the necessity of curbing the disorders resultant on the Fall.[25] For the regenerate government and positive laws are not only needless, but, unless rigorously restricted, detrimental. The ideal state is that represented by Eden, to be able to live without law because "our reason is our law."[26] In the regenerate, under the influence of the Spirit, human nature is daily approximating more closely to its original goodness and its original reliance on the inward law alone. To that state the believer is restored by the Gospel, and it is the true state of Christian liberty. Milton insists that Christian liberty means the abrogation of the whole written or external Law. In the application of the doctrine to the question of religious liberty the analogy has been repeatedly pointed between the now-abrogated Law and positive laws dealing with religion, the "canons and precepts of men," and the withdrawal of these positive laws has been demanded in the name of Christian liberty. If one extended the analogy beyond the religious, to the civil, field—and the abrogated Mosaic Law was moral and political as well as religious—what one would get is precisely the attitude towards positive laws in general, found in the *Second Defence*.

Elsewhere (and notably in the *Areopagitica*) Milton's Puritan pre-occupation with Christian liberty co-operates with the specifically humanistic elements in his thought. But here there is an unmistakable cleavage between

[25] *Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* (*P.W.*, II, p. 9).
[26] *Paradise Lost*, IX, 654.

them, and it is perhaps instructive that Milton renounces a part, at least, of the humanistic inheritance in favour of the Puritan. For Milton, liberty—such liberty as the state can guarantee—is wholly negative in character, consisting in the removal of restrictions upon the individual. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, he sets no value on the educative function of wise law-making or on laws as an aid to virtue. Again, he sets no value on participation in the government of one's country as an important feature of civil liberty, indeed its crown. For Aristotle such participation is a necessary prerequisite of the good life—more than that, an essential part of the good life itself—for individuality can be realized and exercised only in the common life of the state. For Milton the individualist, on the contrary, government is to be undertaken as a duty by such of the able as seem specially called thereto; while for the rest of the regenerate, all the liberty that they can desire is comprised in the negative freedom from interference guaranteed by Milton's *laissez-faire* state.

More significant (and more often observed) is Milton's exclusive concern with the regenerate. The wicked may embrace the new-granted liberty as an occasion of licence: better that it should be so "rather than good men should lose their just and lawful privilege of remedy;"[27] for "God sure esteems the growth and completing of one virtuous person more than the restraint of ten vicious."[28] And in formulating the functions of the state Milton insists on the reduction of positive laws to a minimum in the interests of the regenerate, for whom alone "liberty is the best school of virtue." Wherever the clear-cut Puritan distinction between the regenerate

[27] *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce* (*P.W.*, III, p. 233).
[28] *Areopagitica* (*P.W.*, II, p. 75).

and the unregenerate operates strongly, as it does in Milton's thought, one may get an unlimited emphasis on individual liberty, and may even find this liberty demanded for all; but one will not get fundamental democracy, for democracy means the addition of equality to liberty. To ground the claim for liberty on the idea of Christian liberty is to assume a distinction between Christians and other men and to build into your conception of liberty itself the idea of basic inequality, the inequality between the regenerate and the unregenerate. In so doing Milton illustrates in an extreme degree what may be called the "aristocratic" element inherent in the Puritan position.

Less characteristic of Puritanism is Milton's mode of conceiving the regenerate. From the whole body of his writings it is clear that he conceived the regenerate person as one whose life and thought are marked by order because reason presides over the passions, and rules them, without suppressing them. With this view Milton's reading of the doctrine of Christian liberty harmonizes. Christian liberty, we have said, is in its essence an inward liberty; and Milton is emphatic that "real and substantial liberty . . . is to be sought rather from within than from without."[29] Christian liberty is the peculiar possession of the regenerate, in whom it constitutes no mean part of the total spiritual experience. It would be rash to deny in Milton some evidence of a genuine spiritual experience; but it seems obvious that for him the state of grace connotes rather an ethical condition than a spiritual experience; whereas for the evangelical Christian it connotes, above all, a spiritual experience—the state of grace includes virtue but at the same time transcends it. The overwhelming ethical emphasis in Milton's religious

[29] *Second Defence* (*P.W.*, I, p. 258).

thought is illustrated by the simple equation of the voice of the Spirit in the heart of the believer with the Law of Nature, the fundamental moral law; and it is thus with virtue that Milton finally equates inward liberty. "Love virtue, she alone is free."[30] ". . . Know that to be free is the same thing as to be pious, to be wise, to be temperate and just, to be frugal and abstinent, and lastly to be magnanimous and brave."[31] ". . . Real and substantial liberty . . . is to be sought rather from within than from without and depends . . . on sobriety of conduct and integrity of life."[32]

> . . . True liberty
> . . . always with right reason dwells
> Twinned, and from her hath no dividual being.
> Reason in man obscured or not obeyed,
> Immediately inordinate desires
> And upstart passions catch the government
> From reason and to servitude reduce
> Man, till then free.[33]

Milton's exposition of inward liberty—of Christian liberty in its deepest meaning—is presented wholly in ethical terms. The regenerate, who alone can be truly free, are the wise and the virtuous, whose lives are ordered by reason, not the recipients of a peculiar spiritual experience.

Up to a certain point Milton's ethical emphasis squares well enough with Puritanism, especially with Puritanism in its more moderate or Presbyterian form. Beyond that point there is a sharp divergence. The more extreme Puritan emphasizes a peculiar religious experience. Milton not only emphasizes rather an ethical

[30] *Comus*, l. 1018.
[31] *Second Defence* (*P.W.*, I, p. 298).
[32] *Ibid.*, I, p. 258.
[33] *Paradise Lost*, XII, 83-90.

condition, but the terms in which he explains this ethical condition reveal much of the Christian Humanist as distinct from the Puritan outlook. For Milton's religion is ethical and his ethic is rationalistic, a standpoint characteristic of Whichcote[34] and the other Cambridge intellectuals, and Milton can draw into his concept of inward liberty Stoic, as well as specifically Christian, elements.

This is not to argue that Milton's adoption of Christian theology is in any sense perfunctory, the mere vesture of the age clothing what is at bottom a purely humanistic ethic. Some at least of the dogmas of Christianity, emphasized by Puritanism, are very real to Milton; and certainly none more so than the doctrine of the Fall, the doctrine of Grace (conceived as divine illumination), and the sharp distinction between the regenerate and the unregenerate. Like a minority of the more extreme Puritans (but also like the majority of the Cambridge intellectuals), Milton finally became an Arminian. But despite the fact that the Calvinistic doctrine of Predestination offers a clearer basis for the sharp discrimination of the regenerate and the unregenerate than does the Arminian, there is no evidence that Milton's adoption of Arminianism tends at all to blur the distinction for him. Ultimately Arminian in theory, he perhaps remains to the end largely Calvinist in temper. Or possibly the more satisfactory explanation is this: while Arminianism may be used by the sentimentalist to advance the notion of universal salvation and to blur the distinction between the regenerate and the unregenerate, for the realistic thinker it will merely

[34] "Nothing," said Whichcote, "is more spiritual than that which is moral. Morals are nineteen parts in twenty of all religion" (*Religious and Moral Aphorisms*, nos. 969, 586).

throw on the individual, with increased emphasis, the responsibility for the class in which he finds himself, for his own spiritual and ethical condition, and for his ultimate fate. Increasingly disillusioned with human nature as he observes it and especially by England's apostasy from the cause of pure religion and true freedom, Milton's final estimate of the proportion of the regenerate to the unregenerate was scarcely more hopeful than that of an extreme Calvinistic Puritan like Roger Williams, for whom the regenerate state was marked not by an ethical condition merely, but by a spiritual experience patently vouchsafed to few.

By 1660 the growing conviction that the regenerate, the Honest Party, are a minority of the nation is driven home to Milton. He writes not to convert the majority but "to confirm them who yield not;" for the majority

> have both in reason and the trial of just battle lost the right of their election what the government shall be. Of them who have not lost that right whether they for kingship be the greater number, who can certainly determine? Suppose they be, yet of freedom they partake all alike, one main end of government; which if the greater part value not but will degenerately forego, is it just or reasonable that most voices against the main end of government should enslave the less number that would be free? More just it is, doubtless, . . . that a less number compel a greater to retain . . . their liberty than that a greater number for the pleasure of their baseness compel a less most injuriously to be their fellow slaves.[35]

In the *Ready and Easy Way* all the implications of Milton's conception of liberty come, under the pressure of events, to full light: its radical character, which welcomes the break with historic custom and precedent;[36] the conviction that for practical purposes liberty means

[35] *Ready and Easy Way* (*P.W.*, II, pp. 132-3).

[36] See my "Puritanism and Liberty," in the QUARTERLY, IV, p. 399.

individual freedom—the absence of external restraint, not the right of the majority to live under the form of government that it chooses; and the disregard for the will of that majority, if necessary, in the interests of the regenerate. Milton's principles, as Wordsworth rightly divined, are not democratic but aristocratic (in a somewhat extended sense of that term). To liberty as he conceives it, equality, the second ingredient of democracy, cannot be added.

II

The relation of Puritanism to democracy is beset with problems.

The Puritans do a real service to the cause by repeatedly and insistently bringing the question of liberty forward for discussion. In the struggle for religious liberty the initial impulse was the effort to liberate the regenerate, to prevent "the crowding of free consciences and Christian liberties into canons and precepts of men;" and this effort could be presented as a logical and necessary extension of the principles of the Protestant Reformation. But it quickly became apparent that to liberate the regenerate one must liberate all; and to demand the same liberty for all is to add, in this one field at least, equality to liberty, and thus to take an important step in the direction of democracy.

The struggles for religious and for civil liberty were fought out side by side and with perpetual interaction. In some degree the Puritan carries over into the second battle the principles invoked and the ends aimed at in the first. But in the political field there was an almost insuperable obstacle even to the limited application of the idea of equality feasible, and indeed necessary, in the religious. The pressure of events was in the opposite

direction. The rule of the Puritans was the rule of a minority, and to extend the principle of equality to politics would have been to lose everything for which the long war had been fought. No one but the most doctrinaire Leveller would advocate such a step. But the pressure of events did not operate alone: what makes it so potent upon theory is the fact that events ally themselves with one-half of the Puritan creed. Nothing is more characteristic of Puritan thought than the clear-cut discrimination between saint and sinner,[1] sharpened as it is by that extreme Calvinism which divides all mankind into the Elect and the Reprobate. The number of the Elect is unknown, and even their persons not certainly known, but they are marked by their sanctification and their conviction of their own calling; and the Elect, even in Puritan England, are patently far outnumbered by the Reprobate. Given this outlook, given the conditions of the Puritan victory and rule, and the inference is obvious that the Honest Party (however conceived) represents the regenerate, while its enemies, and the bulk of the nation, represent the unregenerate.

In the political thinking of the more extreme Puritans there are, in reality, two conflicting currents. One reaches its final outcome in the Levellers; the other in the Fifth Monarchists, and (less violently) in all those Puritans who, to any marked degree, emphasize the special privileges and special duties of the regenerate.

In his brilliant little book, *The Essentials of Democracy*, the Master of Balliol insists that the school of democracy was the Independent congregation. There the Leveller found a model in miniature of his democratic state: an

[1]No ground of Puritan protest against the Established Church is commoner than its failure to discriminate sufficiently sharply between saint and sinner: its ministrations are open to all, and, indeed, all are compelled to come in.

autonomous society, composed of equals and based on a contract freely entered into by all; a perfect example, indeed, of the celebrated "contract" theory in operation, and of government by the consent of the governed (the rights of the individual being permanently safeguarded by the power of withdrawal). Most important of all, in Mr. Lindsay's opinion, the government was exercised democratically: decisions were reached by free discussion, and its power of ministering to wise conclusions and to final agreement was demonstrated. Much that is best and most characteristic in the Independent outlook is implied here. Its influence on the Levellers' belief in Agreements of the People as a basis for free discussion and final wise agreement, its influence (we may add) on the *Areopagitica's* plea for free discussion in the interests of truth and agreement, are undeniable. And the practice which the Independent congregation afforded in democratic government is certainly a matter of the first importance.[2]

There is, however, another side to the picture. Viewed in itself, the Independent congregation is a democracy in little; but viewed in relation to the world in which it, for the time being, subsists, it is no democracy but an aristocracy of the Elect. From this only one deduction is possible—a deduction drawn repeatedly in history—that the church is superior to the world and its ways. The superiority may take the form of aloofness: Separatism in its essence means separation from the world. But if the initial barrier separating the saint from the activities of men be overcome—as one way or another it is sure to be, human nature, even when sanctified, being what it is—another consideration remains to deflect the current

[2]Mr. G. D. H. Cole has pointed to a later school of democratic government, the Wesleyan organization (in *Johnson's England*, ed. Turberville, 1933, I, p. 222).

of Independent thought from democracy. The sense of superiority seeks its second expression: the congregation is an outpost of Christ's kingdom; and if the Saints go down into the world must it not be, so far as is feasible, to win and rule it for their "eternal and shortly-expected King"? So at least thought Major-General Harrison and the Fifth-Monarchy enthusiasts; and there seemed to be strong confirmation in the exploits of the Army, whose power—however theorists might talk of the sovereignty of the people—so evidently came not from the people, but from God himself. The extreme application of the "aristocratic" principle in Puritanism is made by the Fifth Monarchy Men, just as the extreme development of all the impulses and influences making for democracy is illustrated in the Levellers. But the aristocratic principle is not confined to the fanatics; it is inherent in Puritanism itself and comes out, in different forms, wherever the Calvinist creed (or temper) with its sharp discrimination between saint and sinner is dominant and is allowed free play in politics: in the Presbyterian ideal of a state the ready minister of God's Kirk; in Milton's determination that the will of the majority must be disregarded in order that the liberty of the regenerate may be guaranteed; in the naïve belief of some of the sectaries that the righteous shall literally inherit the earth.

What was it that permitted one section of the Puritans to escape from the aristocratic implications of the Puritan creed and allowed the analogy of the Independent congregation—a model democracy considered in itself—to operate freely in the political field?

The tendency of Puritanism to argue from theological data in every field and to subordinate to religion all the rest of life, is sufficiently obvious. The Puritan period,

said Lord Acton, is the middle ages of Protestantism. But it is possible to exaggerate this tendency. There is, in reality, a strong counter-current in Puritanism itself, manifested in some (though by no means all) of the Independents and illustrated most clearly in Roger Williams: they insist on the unique character of the religious experience and its consequent severance from the concerns of this world. The result is that counter-tendency to segregate the spiritual and the secular mentioned in my earlier article. It is observed (with several other characteristics of the Puritan mind) by Herr Ernst Cassirer, but for lack of a fuller knowledge of the literature of Puritanism it is not adequately illustrated, nor, to all appearance, is anything like its full implication for Puritanism guessed. One very suggestive point is made, however: the similarity between the Puritan segregation of the spiritual and the secular and the Baconian division of philosophy into "divine" and "natural," with the resultant opposition between the Puritan-Baconian duality of outlook and the Humanists' insistence on a unified view of life, a single standard of rationality and utility to be applied to religion and every other human concern.[3]

Viewed in this light the Independent demand for

[3]In *Die Platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge*, 1932, Herr Cassirer adequately illustrates the Humanist position from Whichcote; but for the Puritan he is thrown back on Whichcote's critic at Cambridge, Antony Tuckney, who does not represent Puritanism in a sufficiently advanced form, and is, indeed, at heart a Presbyterian Humanist. Had he been able to extend his view to Roger Williams, William Dell, and the Levellers, he would have found overwhelming evidence in favour of his thesis. I had worked out the full implications of the separation, in my study of Williams, Milton, and other Puritans, before reading Cassirer, but I am indebted to him for the comparison with Bacon and the sharp contrast with the Humanists. In the QUARTERLY (IV, pp. 1-10) the Archbishop of York deals with some of the larger aspects of the segregation of the spiritual and the secular in the modern world, and significantly assigns to it a double source—in Luther and Descartes.

the absolute separation of church and state, which has already been seen to have momentous consequences, takes on a new significance: it is simply the most direct and obvious application of the principle of segregation. This the argument of Williams, considered in more detail, fully demonstrates. In Williams one has, indeed, the perfect test case: in him all the radical elements in Puritanism reach their full development, but his spiritual interests (for all his addiction to politics) never pale, as do the Levellers', before his social and political interests; his stern Calvinism, the chief origin of the "aristocratic" principle in Puritanism, is never exchanged for the milder Arminian creed; his Puritanism is uncomplicated, and unrelieved, by anything of Miltonic Humanism; his theory moves well ahead of events; and his mind is one of the finest in the period, fully aware, we may be sure, of all the implications in the positions which he assumes.

A startling contrast is presented by Williams's idea of a church and his idea of a state, by his picture of the world viewed in relation to the church, and of the world viewed out of that relation. His idea of a church is restrictive in the last degree: a voluntary communion of self-certified Saints—the most extreme and bigoted Separatist view.[4] His idea of a state is completely secular and completely democratic. Viewed in itself, in its civil and moral aspects merely, the world is a proper object of man's concern; its peace and welfare should engage his attention, and they are to be achieved only by a civil organization in accordance with man's natural rights and with the principle of justice. But

[4]Williams's extreme Separatism is further illustrated by his objection to the New England churches' holding any communion with the Church of England, and his declaration that it is sinful so much as to pray with an unconverted person though a member of one's own family. *Cf.* Edwards, *Gangraena*, pt. i, nos. 114, 132, 133.

viewed in relation to the church, the world and its glories are the Devil's and eternally destined to perish. Fortunately one quotation from *The Bloody Tenent* will make this clear, and will further indicate that I did not run ahead of the facts in describing the Independent congregation as an aristocracy of the Elect subsisting, for the time, in a world peopled by the Reprobate. Protesting against the idea that a church in its beliefs or discipline can be dependent on the state, Williams writes:

> . . . Whereas they say that the civil power may erect and establish what form of civil government may seem in wisdom most meet, I acknowledge the proposition to be most true both in itself, and also considered with the end of it, that a civil government is an ordinance of God to conserve the civil peace of people so far as concerns their bodies and goods. . . .
>
> But from this grant I infer, as before hath been touched, that the sovereign, original, and foundation of civil power lies in the people . . . and, if so, that a people may erect and establish what form of government seems to them most meet for their civil condition. It is evident that such governments . . . have no more power, nor for no longer time, than the civil power, or people consenting and agreeing, shall betrust them with. This is clear not only in reason but in the experience of all commonweals where the people are not deprived of their natural freedom by the power of tyrants.
>
> And if so—that the magistrates receive their power of governing the church from the people—undeniably it follows that a people as a people, naturally considered, . . . have fundamentally and originally as men a power to govern the church, to see her do her duty, to correct her, to redress, to reform, establish, *&c.* And if this be not to pull God and Christ and the Spirit out of heaven and subject them unto natural, sinful, inconstant men, and so consequently to Satan himself, by whom all peoples naturally are guided, let heaven and earth judge![5]

Williams's first object is to secure their Christian liberty

[5] *Bloody Tenent*, pp. 214-5.

for the Saints; his second to secure the civil peace of the world. Throughout the book this twofold reference to the church and the world persists. The Parable of the Tares is made to demonstrate the necessity that every opinion in religion (which does not result in an actual infringement of the civil peace) must be tolerated by the state, which wields only the civil sword, and that nothing but truth and piety may be countenanced by the church, whose commission it is to extirpate error with the spiritual sword.[6] Williams seeks not only the world's peace, but its welfare: his keen sense of justice demands for natural men—the tares in the field, which is the world—their natural rights, as surely as it demands for spiritual men their spiritual rights; but he has no illusions about the ultimate fate of the natural man:

> . . . When the world is ripe in sin . . . then those holy and mighty officers and executioners, the angels, with their sharp and cutting sickles of eternal vengeance, shall down with them and bundle them up for the everlasting burnings. Then shall that man of sin be consumed by the breath of the mouth of the Lord Jesus and . . . be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels . . . and the smoke of their torment shall ascend up for ever and ever (Rev. xiv, 10-11).[7]

In Williams the separation of church and state, or rather the distinction between the spiritual and the secular of which it is the outcome, rests on a sense of the uniqueness of the spiritual experience. There are two kinds of goodness, a natural and a spiritual, and

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 68 *ff.* ". . . The tares [were] to be permitted in the world because otherwise the good wheat would be endangered to be rooted up out of the field or world also, as well as the tares. And therefore for the good sake, the tares, which are indeed evil, were to be permitted; yea, and for the general good of the whole world, the field itself, which for want of this obedience to that command of Christ hath been and is laid waste and desolate with the fury and rage of civil war. . ." (p. 140).

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 83-4.

to the latter alone the gift of eternal salvation is attached:

> . . . Few men either come to or are ordained unto [spiritual or Christian goodness]; God having chosen a little flock out of the world and those generally poor and mean. . . . Yet this I must remember you of, that when the most high God created all things of nothing he saw and acknowledged divers sorts of goodness, which must still be acknowledged in their distinct kinds: a good air, a good ground, a good tree. . . . I say the same in artificials: a good garment, a good house. . . . I also add, a good city . . . a good husband, father, master . . . that is morally, civilly good, in their several civil respects and employments. . . . These I observe to prove that a subject, a magistrate, may be a good subject, a good magistrate, in respect of civil or moral goodness—which thousands want, and where it is, it is commendable and beautiful—though godliness, which is infinitely more beautiful, be wanting, and which is only proper to the Christian state, the commonweal of Israel, the true church, the holy nation (Ephes. ii; 1 Pet. ii).[8]

The higher or Christian goodness includes the lower, the moral and civil, goodness. The spiritual and mystic experience which accompanies the gift of salvation is attended by an ethical result, but it far transcends the result, and it is not for the result that it is chiefly to be valued. Moral and civil goodness may be had on other terms, and though Christian ordinances by their mere presence may conduce to civilization, these things will, spiritually speaking, avail nothing unless the specific spiritual experience is also vouchsafed.[9]

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 211-2. ("Christian state," "commonweal of Israel," "holy nation," are all synonyms for the true church, and do not refer, of course, to any national state.) For the converse of this proposition, the distinction between moral and religious evil, see *The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody* (*Publications of the Narragansett Club*, ser. 1, IV, pp. 137-8).

[9] "The ordinances and discipline of Christ Jesus, though wrongfully and profanely applied to natural and unregenerate men, may cast a blush of civility and morality upon them, as in Geneva and other places—for the shining bright-

The distinction between the merely ethical and the specifically spiritual is clear-cut and complete. The segregation of the spiritual and the secular, of which the separation of church and state is the outward and visible sign, penetrates to the foundations of Williams's thinking. Its primary object is to secure the absolute autonomy of the spiritual sphere. But it has a second result: it banishes from the secular sphere—and notably from the field of politics—every deduction made from theological data; it permits the complete secularization of the state and nullifies, so far as politics is concerned, the "aristocratic" principle inherent in Puritanism, with its sharp discrimination of saint and sinner and its dazzling hope that the Saints shall inherit the earth. For Williams the Army is a body of free men fighting for their natural rights (of which liberty of conscience is one of the most precious); they are not the Elect fighting Christ's battle, for his kingdom is spiritual and his battle fought with a mightier sword.[10] The secularization of politics does not in itself lead necessarily to democracy, but it clears the way for democratic, as for other possible, developments. In the case of Puritanism, however, it removes from the field of politics the great obstacle to the necessary and unreserved addition of equality to liberty. And it releases, to operate in that

ness of the very shadow of Christ's ordinances casts a shame upon barbarism and incivility; yet withal I affirm that the misapplication of ordinances to unregenerate and unrepentant persons hardens up their souls in a dreadful sleep and dream of their own blessed estate and sends millions of souls to hell in a secure expectation of a false salvation" (*Bloody Tenent*, p. 193).

[10]About the Fifth-Monarchy prophecies Williams, despite his inveterate fundamentalism, is sceptical. He will not allow that Christ has given any "pattern, precept, or promise for the undertaking of civil war for his sake" (*Queries of Highest Consideration*, pp. 26-9). Peters, according to Edwards (*Gangraena*, pt. iii, p. 135), held that under the gospel Christians had no right to take up arms for religion, but only to maintain their civil rights and liberties. Even the Civil War was secularized!

field, all those impulses—revolutionary, equalitarian, humanitarian—also inherent in Protestant Christianity and ready to emerge in the Puritan revolt. It further permits the effective emergence of the analogy between an appeal in religion to a primitive model of excellence discoverable in scripture and an appeal in politics to a primitive model of excellence discoverable in nature and by reason; the analogy, again, between Christian privileges and natural rights;[11] and finally, the analogy between the miniature democracy of the Independent congregation and the great democracy of a national state.

In these developments Milton shares only within very definite limits. He insists, in the interests of individual liberty, on the absolute separation of church and state. More than any other single writer he emphasizes the doctrine of Christian liberty, but he so emphasizes it as to keep in constant evidence the distinction between the regenerate and the unregenerate, which it implies. In Williams the distinction is even sharper, but the segregation of the spiritual and the secular restricts its implications to the church. In Milton the segregation is far less complete, because for him the regenerate state primarily connotes not a specific religious experience but an ethical condition. The specific religious experience is far removed from politics, from anything with which the temporal state can concern itself. But ethics and politics are near neighbours (as Williams's phrase "civil or moral goodness" serves to remind us): to interpret the regenerate state as an ethical condition is to invite the intrusion in the field of politics of the sharp discrimination between regenerate and unregenerate. That basically is the difference between Milton and

[11]On these two analogies see my "Puritanism and Liberty" with its quotations from Milton and Overton (QUARTERLY, IV, pp. 401, 404).

Roger Williams. In Milton the separation of church and state is not the symbol of a distinction which extends to the foundations of his thinking. Consequently for Milton there is liberty (interpreted as the maximum freedom from outward restraint) for all; but there is no fundamental equality: when the rights of the majority and the interests of the regenerate clash (as they patently do by 1660) Milton will not hesitate to sacrifice the former to the latter; he will sacrifice equality to liberty, and will take up the paradoxical position that in certain cases the regenerate may justly compel the unregenerate to be free—that is to accept the regenerate as their governors. Milton in reality has more in common with those who champion the privileges and the duties of the Saints than with those who preach the sovereignty of the people and the rights of man. Like them, Milton fails to make, or to make complete, the segregation of the spiritual and the secular.

But he fails, in part at least, for a different reason: he fails because his Puritanism is crossed by so large a measure of Humanism. Christian Humanism is rationalistic and ethical in its emphasis. It insists, moreover, on a unified view of life, on the application (as we have said) of a single standard of rationality and utility in religion and in every other human concern; and it deplores that complete segregation of the spiritual and the secular which leaves religion a prey to irrational dogma and the rest of life a prey to the secular spirit and ultimately to uncontrolled Naturalism.[12] Finally,

[12] The alliance of Puritanism not only with democracy but with Naturalism is one of the features of its later history—a subject with which I hope to deal in the near future. The beginnings of both alliances are already apparent in the period under discussion. The Puritan is emboldened in his advocacy of extreme courses by a sense that the spiritual safety of the Elect is guaranteed. No falsehood can finally deceive them, nothing snatch them from their rock of

Humanism has its own "aristocratic" principles: the idea of "values," of standards, and hence of inequality, is built into the foundation of the humanistic ideal. Milton's Humanism crosses his Puritanism to set limits to the segregation of the spiritual and the secular which is one mark of the extreme Puritan's thought; and it insists on interpreting the regenerate state in humanistic, that is rational and ethical, terms. But while this gives Milton a foot in two camps and lends some of his utterances a peculiar weight, it also prevents him from sharing to the full in some of the more distinctively "liberal" and democratic developments of Puritanism. What one finds in Milton is an alliance of Puritanism and Humanism at the several points where alliance is possible. The individualism of the Reformation and that of the Renaissance meet in him to produce a potent, and perhaps extravagantly individualistic, conception of liberty, but the "aristocratic" principle in Protestant Christianity meets the aristocratic principle in Classical Humanism to prevent that addition of equality to liberty without which the road to democracy is forever barred.

safety: "... Not one elect or chosen of God shall perish. God's sheep are safe in his eternal hand and counsel; and he that knows his material, knows also his mystical stars, their number, and calls every one by name" (*Bloody Tenent*, p. 97).

IS UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ENOUGH?

A. E. Grauer

THE Canadian Unemployment and Social Insurance Act of 1935 has aroused a great deal of comment, mostly adverse. To a large extent this was a reaction from the rather exalted hopes fostered by the prime minister's speeches over the radio. The attitude reminds one somewhat of the early traveller, who, on first seeing the Pacific Ocean, was disappointed because it didn't look larger than any other ocean. To a still greater extent, it was due to widespread misconceptions about the nature of the measure proposed. Unemployment insurance is not, as is popularly supposed, a remedy for unemployment. The economic causes of unemployment lie deep in our industrial system—in the credit mechanism, the system of distribution, the speed of technological improvement, and so forth. Unemployment insurance gets at none of these things. Its only remedial influence is in the building up of reserve funds that carry over some purchasing power from prosperous times to a depression. But, in the main, the causes of unemployment operate whether a system of unemployment insurance exists or not.

If the insurance is not a remedy for unemployment, what is it? It is two things: it is an admission that unemployment, like sickness, is something that may happen to any worker in modern industrial society; and it is an attempt to provide security against this hazard by having all of certain classes of workers pay premiums into a central fund, from which any who later become unemployed may draw benefits for a stipulated period.

This being so, it is obvious that unemployment insur-

ance is not important as a means of abolishing unemployment. In fact, by building up a permanent system to provide some security against unemployment, it rather admits that unemployment cannot be abolished. This does not mean that unemployment insurance has an insignificant rôle to play. In view of the strikingly slow progress that has been made in remedying the causes of unemployment, the provision of some security for the worker against this greatest of all industrial hazards becomes a matter of fundamental importance. Unemployment insurance is an attempt to provide such security in an organized, expedient, and dignified way.

Basically, then, unemployment insurance is an attempt to meet the human problems raised by the fact of unemployment. Does it meet these problems successfully? The most we can say is that it partially does so. Here, the system is limited by the fact that it is an *insurance* scheme. The claimants of benefits must first qualify by paying a certain number of premiums into the fund. What good is this to the worker who has not got a job, and who therefore cannot qualify? Even after the worker qualifies, he is eligible, on becoming unemployed, for only a previously specified number of benefit payments—a necessary provision if the fund is to remain solvent. In a prolonged depression like the present, what likelihood has the insured worker of getting a new job before his benefit payments run out? The conclusion inexorably follows that unemployment insurance, good as it is in its field, is not enough to meet the human needs of the contemporary unemployment situation. It must be supplemented by an organized system of relief. This brief analysis is amply borne out by British experience with unemployment insurance. Roughly, there have been three periods in that experience.

(1) From its inception in 1911 until the post-War depression of the early twenties, the unemployment-insurance fund met all its benefit liabilities out of its own income. It was, in short, a *bona-fide* system of insurance. But, unfortunately, the continued heavy unemployment of the twenties soon made the fund insolvent.

(2) There followed the expedient of government subsidies, and various extensions of the benefit period, which in effect saddled the insurance system with much of the burden of relief and made it still less capable of meeting benefit payments out of its own income. This is the period during which more fortunate countries were wont to speak disparagingly of the British "dole"—a holier-than-thou attitude that quickly disappeared when heavy unemployment in turn struck them. In Great Britain, too, the system met with much criticism, good-humoured and otherwise. Lord Dawson of Penn tells the story of a labourer, long unemployed, who remarked to his physician: "Doctor, do you know I had an offer of work some days ago which would have given me five shillings a week more than I am getting from the dole, but after giving it thorough reflection, I preferred to remain *independent*." And, in truth, the system was very much of a hotch-potch. British governments persisted in hoping that better economic conditions would relieve the pressure. The continuance of the world depression gradually killed that hope. The Unemployment Act of 1934 is a monument to the new outlook that accepts present facts at their face value and attempts to meet them on the basis of past experience and intelligent analysis.

(3) The title sounds the key-note for the new approach. It is an "unemployment" act now, not an "unemployment insurance" act. Unemployment insurance is relegated to its proper place, as one means only

of meeting the devastating contemporary situation. For the first time, an attempt is made to view the problem as a whole from the human point of view. Briefly, the Unemployment Act of 1934 has four main aspects: unemployment insurance, unemployment relief, rehabilitation, and education. The last of these may be passed over quickly because it has little point for Canadians. Under the old system, there was a gap between the school-leaving age (which was fourteen) and the earliest qualifying age for unemployment insurance (sixteen). Now, this gap is closed in such a way that it practically means the raising of the school-leaving age—an educational reform of outstanding importance. The provision for unemployment insurance is structurally the same as in previous acts, except for certain extensions made in connection with the educational reform just mentioned. This part of the scheme may be more profitably taken up later, in comparison with the Canadian system. The provisions of the act for unemployment relief are perhaps its most important innovation. They provide for a national service to give regular money payments to all unemployed wage-earners who are unable to qualify for the insurance scheme. These include farm-labourers and domestic workers, who never came under the insurance system, as well as those numerous individuals who are technically disqualified (*e.g.*, through their inability to complete the stipulated thirty payments), and who were previously treated as paupers and provided for by the local Poor Law. In effect, practically all the able-bodied poor are now taken out of the hands of the local Poor Law authorities, where they had been since the time of Elizabeth, and put under the care of the nation. The importance of this change is indicated by the creation of

a new department of state, the Unemployment Assistance Board.

The introduction of this new system recognizes, in the first place, the need of a relief system to supplement insurance if the contemporary unemployment situation is to be realistically faced. Secondly, it recognizes that such a relief system should be a national, not a local, concern. There are several reasons for this, the basic one being that unemployment is not evenly distributed and the local authorities of the hardest-hit areas are precisely those least able financially to shoulder heavy relief charges. Unemployment is a national calamity, and the welfare of the citizens is, in the last analysis, a national responsibility. Thirdly, it recognizes that unemployment is an ever-present problem of our industrial system, by setting up a permanent, rather than a temporary, administrative system for unemployment assistance. Finally, it recognizes that would-be workers who through no fault of their own are unemployed, should not be forced into the degrading status of paupers, but should be given a well-ordered form of relief that will allow for human feelings. It does not go the whole distance of recognizing payments for unemployment assistance as a matter of right irrespective of other considerations. For instance, it establishes the test of need and consequently investigates family resources before allowing payments. But at any rate it does much to treat the human problems involved in the present unemployment situation in a well-organized and dignified way.

The fourth chief concern of the act is the broader one of rehabilitation and training. This is not an innovation, for the work was started ten years ago by the Ministry of Labour's training centres. But now, this type of work is given greater weight and larger sums are being appro-

priated for it. It is an attempt to counteract the injurious effects on physique and morale caused by prolonged unemployment. Various organizations have been created. Some, like the physical training classes and the summer camps, are concerned almost solely with physical rehabilitation. Others go in for training which not only provides the unemployed person with a new interest, but fits him for a new kind of job. Thus, under the system of government training centres, men have been taken from the depressed areas and given a short but intensive course in one or other of a wide variety of new trades. Physique is taken into consideration, and the less robust may become, for instance, hairdressers or cooks; or your waiter in a London hotel may be a former textile worker from Manchester. Similarly, there are centres for training women for domestic service, and others where the unskilled labourer is given a short "pick-and-shovel" course, which, if it teaches him no new craft, improves him physically and renders him more employable. Private organizations have also borne their part in similar efforts. It has been estimated that during 1934 they gave to not less than 300,000 unemployed persons some kind of training, whether recreational, cultural, or vocational.

Such broadly conceived plans to combat the disintegrating effects of prolonged unemployment on the individual are obviously worthy of immediate imitation and elaboration. It is true that some aspects of the policy have definite limitations. The training schemes are expensive for debt-ridden public exchequers, and they are not even a partial solution for unemployment, because, except in a period of business expansion, when the newly trained man gets a job he merely displaces someone else. But they are important in keeping up morale and craftsmanship at a time when both these invaluable assets are

fast disappearing. For this reason alone, Canada might be well advised to follow Britain's example of establishing non-residence training centres which would allow the skilled worker to maintain his skill and the less skilled worker to learn a craft. As most of our unemployed are in the cities, this should not be too difficult to organize. If vocational training has limitations, the same cannot be said of recreational and cultural. The scope of adult education is limitless. And the use of general lectures, the radio, moving pictures, theatres, and museums, to promote interest in the arts, the sciences, literature, history, and economics, has been barely begun. Indeed, in this respect, the depression merely presents in an acute form that fundamental problem of ever-growing importance to modern societies, "What are we going to do with our leisure time?"

The Canadian Unemployment and Social Insurance Act is avowedly patterned after the British system as far as unemployment insurance is concerned. There are some differences. For instance, the British government contributes to the insurance fund equally with the employer and worker, while the Canadian government contributes less. The Canadian system is less liberal in the length both of its benefit and qualifying periods. For the worker, the rates both of contribution and benefit are higher in Canada than in Great Britain, as is proper in relation to our higher standard of living. Finally, the British plan covers a considerably wider field of industry than does the Canadian.

Strangely enough, the British act would, in many ways, suit Canadian conditions better than the Canadian act. The outstanding characteristic of Canadian economic life is its seasonal nature. The Canadian worker, therefore, is more exposed to seasonal unemployment than

the workers of most other countries. Yet the British system affords much better protection against this danger than does the Canadian. In the first place, it covers more occupations. The Canadian act has deliberately ruled out the more seasonal industries. In the second place, the British worker can qualify for benefits by paying thirty weekly premiums into the fund; but the Canadian worker must make forty such payments, and a period of that length will automatically disqualify most seasonal workers. Finally, the British worker, on becoming unemployed, may draw benefits for six months, a period more adequate for seasonal unemployment than the Canadian's seventy-eight days.

"The great thing," said Oliver Wendell Holmes, "is not so much where we stand as in what direction we are going." The Canadian act is disappointing, but it contains provisions which may well take us in the right direction. The Employment and Social Insurance Commission set up to administer the act is specifically charged with certain important investigations. These have all sorts of possibilities. The commission is to look into possible methods of rehabilitating unemployed persons and of training them to increase their skill. It is to report on the feasibility of extending insurance to employments at present exempted and on the possibility of broadening the present system by the introduction of supplementary schemes. These are most important charges and serve to make the commission the focal point of the whole system. If a properly qualified, non-political body is appointed, Canada should soon know whether it can afford not to support a permanent unemployment service more befitting the seriousness of the present situation. The importance of the personnel of this commission, and its freedom of action, cannot be too much emphasized.

Moreover, it is greatly to be hoped that the commission will not be so over-burdened with administrative details as to fail in the immediate execution of its wider tasks. The unemployed are obviously becoming restive and their hopes have been raised so high by political promises of reform that it would be dangerous to postpone action.

There is one statement in the act which may constitute a serious bar to the future growth of the system. The principle is laid down that unemployment relief shall remain a responsibility of the municipalities and the provinces. In fact, this principle has already broken down and the federal government has been obliged to aid the provinces; indeed it has broken down in every other country that has sought to maintain it, for the principle is one that will work only in more prosperous times. To attempt to adhere rigidly to it now is merely to prevent a well-organized and intelligent handling of relief. After all, relief has been for several years our most important problem. One recognizes in the federal structure of our government certain possible obstacles in the way of change. But the critical nature of the present situation in unemployment is so powerful a force that none of these obstacles can be regarded as insurmountable.

To sum up, we may conclude that unemployment insurance is a valuable measure of social reform but that it has inherent limitations which must be clearly recognized. In the first place, because it is an insurance scheme, it cannot possibly cope with the great number of persons who during a depression are thrown out of work for long periods of time. It requires to be supplemented by a well-planned system of relief. Secondly, it does not take into account the broader considerations of human welfare—the physique and morale of the unemployed person, his craftsmanship, and his educational potential-

ities. Thirdly, it does not attack the basic problem, the causes of unemployment. Indeed, by concentrating on results, not causes, and by giving people the false feeling that the situation is being adequately met, it tends to obscure the pressing necessity for attacking the causes. But as long as the chief causes of breakdown are allowed to operate—as long as the credit mechanism is allowed to get out of hand and our present maldistribution of income allowed to remain—far from having any assurance that the unemployment situation is being adequately met, we cannot even be certain that our industrial system will survive.

ON INTERPRETING LOCKE

F. H. Anderson

JOHN LOCKE plays an extraordinary rôle among classic philosophers. His political doctrines have with unabashed literalness passed into constitutional practice, while his theory of knowledge has become a commonplace the world over. His *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, someone has justly remarked, "is one of those books which have been so thoroughly assimilated by that part of the world which cares in the most cursory manner for speculative subjects, that large numbers of people naturally suppose themselves to have read it, when in point of fact they never have."

And his career is remarkable in another respect; that coherency in argument and ordered sequence in presentation which are demanded of the philosophic theorist are not looked for in this "ingenious writer." No one, apparently, presumes logical urbanity in his case. His acute "perception of fact" sometimes atones for inconsequence of statement; usually, however, the modern critic, in pursuit of prevalent philosophic designs, regards his work at the outset as a singular assemblage of epistemological shreds and political patches. This verdict, of course, does not necessarily occasion every inquirer about Locke great concern; what appears to the philosophical commentator as dire necessity may often be accepted as a promising sign of abundant life by the *littérateur*. Classic writing, for the latter, is neither made nor destroyed by metaphysical scaffolding; the overwrought and overladen language of philosophic propositions is not of the essence of prose; its ultimates are a little too pretentious; its renunciation of style is the patent sign of literary

insipidity. These are consolations, however, which are denied the eager student of Locke, who is repeatedly assured that this writer is quite without the gift of style. "He seems," deplores the typical critic, "to have a contempt for all the arts of literature, and passes from sentence to sentence, like a man talking aloud in his study." Thus are Locke's host of effective utterances, which have been assimilated into the language and understanding of the world, deprived by literary law-givers of status in the empire of letters.

Of status in the empire of letters, but not of authority in the commonwealth of ideas: no commentator who possesses even a meagre acquaintance with the history of Western thought, quite regardless of Locke's contributions in the fields of epistemology and politics, would be prepared to deny the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* a pre-eminent agency in authorizing and liberating two classes of objects dear to all literary critics, namely, "the senses"—puritan though the author is—and "ideas," as distinct from phantasy. To be sure, others before Locke acknowledge the efficacy of the senses in the production of noetic essences, but none is prepared to endow them with epistemological rights of their own. Writers of the schools recognize the function of sensation in human perception, with the addendum that celestial beings do not require this faculty. Others make sensation the source of atheism or agnosticism or immorality. Locke accepts it unashamedly as the normal activity of human capacity. And when, as a result of this acquiescence, the inevitable "sensualist" is hurled in his direction, he retorts: "A man that insinuates . . . as if I held that the distinction of virtue and vice is to be picked up by our eyes or ears or our nostrils, shows so much ignorance or so much malice that he deserves no other answer but pity." The career

of sensation after Locke's bestowal of enfranchisement could not be recorded in a life-time of labour. It is the *medius terminus* of endless literary dispute. No thinker in any subject from religion to politics, from science to art, overlooks it. The source of many an aesthetic, it preserves Anglo-Saxon criticism from Continental "profundities;" and, not least, it assists in creating an environment in which sensuous poetry arises and attains unto great beauty.

Locke frees ideas from theological, political, and metaphysical subjection. His account of them as the objects of human thinking is greeted with sneers by the learned and with fears by those whose business it is to instruct simple souls, while one Sargent writes a book, somewhat appropriately called *Solid Philosophy*, in order to combat its pernicious influences. Not, of course, that the term "idea" is unused; there are those who describe ideas as the gift, or even the essence, of Divinity; and others employ them as the means of doubting dogmas. To Locke, however, belongs the credit of divorcing this concept from the restricted connotations of a prevailing tradition, and of accepting, without reference either to faith or to scepticism, ideas as objects excellent in themselves, as things which the human creature naturally produces, combines, and uses in thought and action. These objects of thought, he explains, function in their representation of an intelligible world. This realm, he insists with firmness and conciliation, extends beyond the creeds of sects and the prejudices of parties. And as a result of his endeavours, the succeeding pilgrimages of those who live in rational—as distinct from phantastic—prose and poetry are no longer confined by the leading of Enthusiasts and Papists and Conformists, to Damascus, and through Purgatory, and to Canterbury, but travel

adventurous ways where the wind blows and the spirit wills.

Such considerations aside, the interpretation of Locke is notoriously difficult. The historian of literature invariably assigns him a paragraph, dismissing his works after a word on their author's eminence among "empirical" influences in modern thought. Nor is this abrupt treatment a penalty meted out at the judgment-seat of history to an offender who violates the literary proprieties. No competent critic will condemn an author with something to say just because he refuses to state his reflections after the literary fashion of his predecessors, and chooses, with Locke, to utter his observations with the mannerisms of his contemporaries' *talk*. The trouble lies far deeper, in the problem of finding out what Locke actually does. When his specific conclusions, logical and political, are discovered, the task of interpretation is only well begun.

In the first place, Locke is identified with the greater portion of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century in both thought and action: he occupies several public offices and experiences intensely the vicissitudes of a distraught people who suffer moral and religious bondage under some half-dozen alternating saints and sinners. And this period of history, apart from quarrels and intrigues among King, Parliament, Church, State, Independents, Papists, Comprehensionists, and Non-Comprehensionists, remains obscure. Letters, in which a library of sermons bulks large, are polemical, without reflective detachment. Milton, the greatest singer of the age, tells of quarrels on earth and in heaven; Bunyan allegorizes battles in the soul, while dramatists, who write for an audience too polemically effete to respond to alarums, make cynical observations from the wings of the political stage on the tactics of parties who fight for

fearful odds. But Locke never joins those who storm the citadel of heaven or those who frequent the Slough of Despond, and rarely does he betray a political partisanship. Free of vanity and scornful of ignorance, he observes, deliberates, writes; and through his mature consideration of the allegiances of men he becomes the protagonist of tolerance in religion, the prophet of liberalism in science, and the successful advocate of freedom in Western politics.

Again, Locke makes no reference in his major works to those who have written before him. He quotes no authorities and employs no traditional formulas. He acknowledges neither doctrinal nor termal indebtedness, takes no side in historic controversy, and exhibits none of that mixture of contempt and respect for scholastic postulates which characterizes the polemic of his contemporaries. His writings, indeed, are the surest evidence that subjects of great concern are now being removed by certain "ingenious" persons from learning to investigation. Traditional formulation is being gradually supplanted by a simple sort of description, which appears faint and hesitant beside the arrogant nomenclatures sanctioned by the Schools. An age of enlightenment, in whose reflected rays the eighteenth century is to grow scientifically vain, is being ushered in. Newton the mathematician, Boyle the physicist, and Sydenham the physician are at work, and Locke is joining in their labours. The subjects of his investigations will be various, sometimes atmospheric changes, sometimes diseased bodies, more often men's minds, social customs, and human attainments.

Learning in the seventeenth century is not easily defined. What Locke repudiates with tremendous consequences for modern thought cannot be readily stated. This much, however, is sure: if we may trust Locke and

certain contemporaries, learning includes history, language study, chronology, logic, disputation, and quotation from authorities. These divisions of knowledge date from mediaeval times, but they are no longer mediaeval in intent and agency. They are not instruments to make comprehensible the rule and contemplation of a church claiming universality. Moreover, the wonder and humanism of the Renaissance, which have brought them quickening for two centuries, are spent and departed. The spirit is gone; only dead terms and argumentation remain. Having relinquished living ideas, learning turns to ashes, and rhetoric broods over the relics. Milton's invocation of the Heavenly Muse is not the boast of a seventeenth-century "enthusiast;" it is the cry of a parched soul for living waters in the desert of polemic, pugnacious oratory, and satire.

History no longer reconstructs ages of light and deliverance, but becomes the magnification of relatively insignificant facts to prove or disprove controversial claims. In the study of the languages of the past the means of expression is taken for the end. Chronology is nothing more than an "unedifying stuffage of the mind." Logic is sophistry composed of argumentation about such trifles as the difference "between Dog and Dog, one signifying celestial sign, and the other a terrestrial animal." University learning, which is mostly disputation, "is not," to quote a contemporary,

> a way to the acquisition of new truths, nor as such intended, but only a sort of exercise or sport of the mind, whose end is nothing else but to mix and intangle truth with falsehood, by the help of some little tricks and quirks, by which either side of the question may be maintained, and neither of the litigants seem to yield, though the propositions they hold be never so absurd, and the reason to the contrary never so strong. And

> truly this is the issue of all public exercises, where oftentimes in the same Chair opinions are disputed by turns, and are equally victorious, while in the meantime the matter is not at all cleared, and truth lies as near the bottom of the well as ever it did before.

And Locke writes:

> If the use and end of right reasoning be to have right notions and a right judgment of things, to distinguish betwixt truth and falsehood, right and wrong, and to act accordingly; be sure not to let [the student] be bred up in the art and formality of disputing, either practising it in himself or admiring it in others; unless, instead of an able man, you desire to have him an insignificant wrangler, opiniatre in discourse, and priding himself in contradicting others, or, which is worse, questioning every thing, and thinking there is no such thing as truth to be sought, but only victory, in disputing. There cannot be any thing so disingenuous, so misbecoming a gentleman or any one who pretends to be a rational creature, as not to yield to plain reason and the conviction of clear arguments.... For this, in short, is the way and perfection of logical disputes, that the opponent never takes any answer, nor the opponent ever yields to any argument.

As for the quoting of authorities, "A well-read man signifies," to quote the same contemporary, "the very same as a learned man in most men's dictionaries." "Author-mongers ... pass for men of shrewd learning, and vast reading."

> 'Tis accounted learning to have tumbled over a multitude of books especially if *great* ones and *old* ones and obscure ones, but most of all manuscripts.... To know the thing is nothing, because so plain and easy; but to know that Aristotle held it, that's the learning.... Though I know very well and am able to demonstrate the grounds of the Atomical Philosophy, or the motion of the earth, or the circulation of the blood, yet I shall not be admitted into the Order of the Learned, unless I am able to tell that Moscus the Phoenician invented the first, and that Democritus and Leucippus afterwards improved it, and

> that the two latter owe their discovery to Copernicus and Harvey.

Repudiating learning, Locke turns to "historical, plain" observation and plain statement. His choice of language is a deliberate one. He condemns "captious and fallacious use of doubtful words, which . . . least suits . . . a lover of truth of any thing in the world," attacking the "predicaments and predicables" of the logicians, and arguing, in his medical writings, that "the Galenists' sour humours, or the chymists' sal, sulphur, and mercury, or the late prevailing invention of acid and alkali, or whatever hereafter shall be substituted to these with new applause, will upon examination be found to be but so many learned empty sounds, with no precise determinate signification." In "The Epistle to the Reader" of the *Essay* he contends that knowledge

> had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much cumbered with the learned, but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the sciences and there made an art of to that degree that philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit, or incapable, to be brought into well-bred company and polite conversation. Vague and insignificant forms of speech and abuse of language have so long passed for mysteries of science, and hard or misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them that they are but the covers of ignorance and hindrances of true knowledge. To break in upon the sanctity of vanity and ignorance will be, I suppose, some service to human understanding.

Thus Locke's selection of words is strategic. He refuses to choose his vocabulary from words weighted with prejudice out of the dungeon of learning; he is anxious

verbally to relate the study to the drawing-room, and would divest literary statement of pedantic morphologies, learned decorations, and bookish illustrations. And even while in his writings what is perhaps the most difficult part of English prose—philosophic description—is being freed of verbal excrescences, and while his logical sayings, scornful of the Latin idioms of the Schools, are breaking upon cloistered ears, like the artless sayings of a polite countryman, a new literary language, which is to make possible an honest clarity in English prose, is coming into being. Locke's vocabulary contains the words and rhythms of common speech. If it be "undistinguished" and possess but relatively few of those enduring idioms which are the gifts of great originators to a language, it is also devoid of cant, and, what is of the greatest moment, every reader of every class can, once more, understand the utterances of a writer who is also a thinker.

By far the greater portion of Locke's writing possesses a commendable literary style. Phrases are lucid, sentences well balanced, arguments coherent and ordered, with relative emphasis and subordination of parts. Much of the prose in the political treatises is exceedingly fine. His most famous work, however, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, on which his reputation as a careless writer rests, is without dimensions and design. It lacks that fastidiousness in the selection of essentials and in the subordination of accidentals which characterizes good composition. Without pattern, it is strung together by agglomeration. This work, the author tells us, was not at its inception intended for the public, "except half-a-dozen." It was "begun by chance" with "some hasty and undigested thoughts" set down for a meeting of a group of acquaintances perplexed over the range of human capability, "continued by entreaty, written by incoherent

parcels, and after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my humour or occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement, where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest it." "This discontinued way of writing," he observes, "may have occasioned, besides others, two contrary faults, *viz.*, that too little or too much may be said in it . . . the way it has been written in, by catches, and many long intervals of interruption, being apt to cause some repetitions. But to confess the truth, I am now too lazy, or too busy, to make it shorter."

Taken as a whole, the *Essay* reads like a compilation, in which descriptions of human capacities follow tales from "Mingrelia or Peru," and analyses of human motives mingle with discourses on Pharoah and Gideon, while pamphlets full of "gentle and improving irony" alternate with light and witty causeries. And what an effective compilation it is! The countless blanks and breaches of its argument serve as an abiding example of philosophic sincerity: here is a thinker who never overcomes an obstacle either by dramatizing a perplexity or by endowing a factor in the situation with transcendental attributes. And in place of what, along with a score of others, might be overlooked as "another seventeenth-century metaphysical system," the author presents the world with observations which constrain the wise of every age, with sayings on temporal themes which belong to no one period of time, with reflections upon contemporary issues which never grow obsolescent.

DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN CANADA

ESCOTT REID

OF late, Capitalists and Socialists in Canada have agreed in a fear of the menace of anti-democratic forces, the Capitalists seeing Communism in every Liberal utterance and the Socialists detecting Fascism in every reactionary remark. What is no doubt much more significant, the veteran of Canadian politics, Henri Bourassa, has from his seat in the House of Commons prophesied that, unless the two old parties mend their ways, disillusionment with parliamentary democracy will grow to such proportions that it will cause a violent overthrow of our traditional system of government.[1]

To attempt to assess the menace which anti-democratic movements may constitute in Canada in the near future, it will be best to start with a simple proposition with which almost everyone will agree. It is that our traditional system of government might very well break down if a Canadian political party secured considerable support for a programme which made it clear that, when the party got into power by constitutional means, it would make it impossible for its opponents ever to get back into power. Or if, in other words, it said: "We are a constitutional party in that we seek a majority in parliament by constitutional means. But once we have control of parliament, we will pass legislation abolishing all other parties, abolishing freedom of mind, of discussion, of the press, abolishing adult franchise; once we are returned to power we are going to stay in power until we are dis-

[1] *Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada*, January 30, 1934, p. 105; January 22, 1935, p. 118.

lodged by force." Such a programme would be quite legal. It would constitute a frank avowal of the intention to use the machinery of democracy in order to accomplish the downfall of democracy. If such an attempt succeeded, it would mean that democracy had committed suicide.

This is in effect what the Nazi party said in Germany up to January, 1933, and what they did after January, 1933. The Nazi promise to abolish the party system and democracy was accompanied by a promise that "heads shall roll in the sand," but executions are not an indispensable feature of a Fascist revolution accomplished by democratic means.

What are believers in democracy to do when confronted with such a situation? If they remain true to their democratic principles and allow freedom of discussion to such a Fascist party, they make it possible for one-half of the population to take away the rights of the other half, and to abolish democracy. Their adherence to democratic principles betrays democracy into the power of its enemies. On the other hand, if they declare the Fascist party illegal, they have abolished "free competition of different political ideas"[2]—they have abolished democracy. And since they will probably not abolish the Fascist party until it constitutes a real threat, this means that they will declare illegal a party having the support of, say, thirty per cent. of the people. They will drive that party underground; they will have to put in force repressive measures against it; they may provoke it to armed uprising. It would appear, therefore, that as soon as there arises the possibility that a Fascist party may

[2]See *International Affairs*, December, 1934, p. 766, for Sir Ernest Barker's definition of democracy as "government by the free competition of different political ideas."

attain office by constitutional means, democratic government becomes almost impossible. The same situation will arise if a substantial measure of public support is given to a Communist or any other party which declares that it intends to attain office by constitutional means, but that having attained office it is going to stay in power until dislodged by force.

The justification for democracy's giving up democracy in order to fight such Fascist or Communist parties is that, if it permits these parties to progress unhampered, they may succeed in obtaining office and will proceed to abolish democracy and make it impossible for the people by constitutional means to put them out of office at the end of the normal period. In other words, they will make it impossible for the people when they are tired of Fascism or Communism to elect an anti-Fascist government, or an anti-Communist government.

Now what about a left-wing Socialist party—a party that is really in earnest about Socialism and intends to make a smashing frontal attack on Capitalism during its first four or five years of office? Such a party would have taken to heart the advice of the late E. F. Wise of the British Labour party: "The first objective of a Socialist Government as soon as it attains office . . . [is to make it] quite impossible for any succeeding Government, by mere repeal of legislation or other means, even to attempt to reconstruct the capitalist system. We must make such an omelette that it is impossible for the eggs to get back into their shells."[3] A left-wing Socialist government which followed this advice would differ from a Fascist government in that it would not make impossible its own defeat. Like a Fascist government, however, it would

[3]Christopher Addison, C. R. Attlee, and others, *Problems of a Socialist Government*, London, 1933, p. 69.

intend to make impossible a return to the sort of government which preceded it.

Has a democratic anti-Socialist government, then, as much justification in forcibly suppressing a left-wing Socialist party as has a democratic anti-Fascist government in suppressing a Fascist party? The answer must certainly be no, so long as it is clear that a Socialist government will retain democracy defined as "the free competition of different political ideas." Indeed, it can be argued that since Socialist measures tend to equalize the strength of different economic groups and classes in the community, they will make possible that truly free competition of different political ideas, which is the mark of real democracy. If, however, a Socialist party says that it is in favour of using democratic means to attain power, but that once having attained power, it intends to keep it, by refusing to allow the people the right to put it out of office at the end of the normal period, and by refusing freedom of discussion, assembly, press, and so on, then that party is not justified in appealing to democratic principles in its struggle for office, and a democratic government has as much justification in using force to suppress it as it has in using force to suppress a Fascist party. This is not to say, of course, that a Socialist party may not be justified in declaring that once it gets power it is going to keep it. It is merely to say that this is a veiled appeal to force, and the party that takes the sword must be prepared to perish by the sword.

What it comes down to is this. Democratic government is only workable if it is carried on in obedience to a set of unwritten rules of fair play. According to these rules a party must not, when in office, so load the dice against its opponents that it makes it almost impossible for them ever to be returned to power, or if returned

almost impossible for them ever to do anything. A Conservative party in control of both houses of the federal parliament must not exercise its legal right to pass a franchise act establishing such a high property qualification that no Liberal or Socialist party could hope to attain power by constitutional means even if it had the support of an overwhelming majority of the adult population. A party in power must not gerrymander the constituencies so flagrantly that it is possible for it in a straight two-party fight to retain a majority in parliament even though it receives only a third of the popular vote.

It is all, of course, a matter of degree. A party may commit minor violations of the rules and still not make democratic government impossible. Sir John A. Macdonald, for instance, introduced a gerrymander, the probable effect of which was to postpone the defeat of the Conservative government from 1887 to 1896. If he had introduced a more thorough-going gerrymander which would have made it impossible for the Liberals to win in 1896, 1900, 1904, or 1908, democratic government might very well have broken down and a revolution of some sort have taken place.

Let us examine this thesis a little more carefully. It may throw some light on the future of democratic government. The thesis is: democratic government is workable only if it is carried on in obedience to a set of unwritten rules of fair play—that is to say, if it is carried on in the spirit of a game. But though unwritten rules of fair play may be honoured in a game, they are not honoured in a struggle between opposing armies. They have no application to battles. Therefore, once the struggle between opposing political forces becomes not a game but a battle, unwritten rules of fair play are not likely to be

honoured, and democratic government becomes impossible.

That is the danger which confronts this country and other democratic countries in the future. Hitherto the struggle between political parties in this country has been a game between "Ins" and "Outs," between Reds and Blues, between Liberals and Conservatives. Certainly the parties were not playing simply for the love of the game, though that did provide an incentive; they were also playing for stakes—the stakes of power, patronage, prestige, and privy councillorships. The political game was fought between professional teams but it was still a game. Is it going to remain a game in future? Or will the differences between political parties become so great that the political game will become political warfare? Many critics have in the past pointed the finger of scorn at our political parties because, in spite of all their protestations about Liberal principles or Conservative principles, there has, in practice, been no essential difference between them. If in the future our parties become homogeneous and doctrinaire; if the gulf between them becomes great; we shall get reality in our party politics instead of sham, and the cost may be the breakdown of democratic government. The sham political battle fought on the hustings may become a real political battle fought on the barricades.

One has an uneasy feeling that, given fundamental differences between political parties, this is bound to happen. A general election is an absurd business. It is only because it has not made much difference to most of us whether or not the government was defeated that we have been able to tolerate its absurdities.

Take the last general election for example. In 1930 the Conservative party scored a smashing victory, in-

creasing its representation in the House from 91 to 138 in a House of 245 members. The Liberal majority of 25 in the election of 1926 was turned into a Conservative majority of 31. The *New York Times* in an editorial a fortnight after the election spoke of the recent and emphatic Conservative mandate. Its Ottawa correspondent wrote that it had been no ordinary electoral cataclysm which had put the Conservative party in power. Mr. Bennett, himself, as soon as the results were known, issued the following statement: "The policy of the Conservative party has been accepted by the people of Canada as the instrument of national development. . . . This Dominion-wide expression of confidence insures a solid government."

This all sounds as if the voters had given an emphatic endorsation to Conservative policies, as if they had in overwhelming numbers deserted the Liberal party and flocked to the Conservative standard. As a matter of fact, what happened was that out of every 100 voters two left the Liberal party for the Conservative party and one left the independent parties for the Conservative party. Forty-six out of every 100 voters had been Conservatives in 1926; 49 out of every 100 voters were Conservatives in 1930. From 1926 to 1930 Canada was ruled by a government which had been elected by 48.6 per cent. of the voters; from 1930 to 1935 she has been ruled by a government elected by 49.2 per cent. of the voters. A net change in party allegiance of one voter out of every thirty caused the landslide of 1930.

Another way of putting this is to say that if the Conservative strength had remained at the level of 1926 (45.9 per cent.) the number of Conservative voters would have been 1,740,000. Actually it was 1,865,000 (49.2 per cent.). Conservative policy would have been rejected in 1930 as ignominiously as it had been in 1926 had not

125,000 voters out of a total of 3,850,000 changed their minds. These voters, equal in number to the persons who voted in three Montreal constituencies at the last federal election,[4] changed their party allegiance from obscure, varied, and for the most part irrational motives —some because they disliked what they called French domination of the Liberal government, others because they were angered by the cheapness of butter or by the everlasting sameness of governments, by the Saskatchewan Liberal machine or by their inability to find employment. Yet regardless of the reasons or lack of reasons for the increase in the Conservative vote from 46 per cent. in 1926 to 49 per cent. in 1930, and regardless of the fact that a minority of the voters voted Conservative in 1930, the new prime minister interpreted the results of the election as a Dominion-wide expression of confidence in the policy of the Conservative party as the proper instrument of national development.

Suppose for the sake of argument that the last election had been fought not between a Liberal government and a Conservative opposition but between a Capitalist government and a left-wing Socialist opposition. Suppose, further, that the Socialist party had the intention, the determination, and the power, if they constituted the government to do what E. F. Wise advocated and thus to make it "quite impossible for any succeeding Government, by mere repeal of legislation or other means, even to attempt to reconstruct the capitalist system." The general election takes place. The Socialists increase their vote from 46 per cent. to 49 per cent. of the total vote cast and secure a majority of 31 in the House of Commons. The Capitalist vote drops from 48.6 per cent. to 46 per

[4]Jacques Cartier, 44,800; Maissonneuve, 34,196; St. Denis, 45,396; total, 124,392.

cent. and the Capitalist party loses half its seats in the House. A net change in party allegiance of one voter in every thirty has resulted in the election on a minority vote of a Socialist government with an overwhelming majority in Parliament and has given it power to liquidate Capitalism. The *New York Times* speaks of the recent and emphatic Socialist mandate. Its Ottawa correspondent writes that it has been no ordinary electoral cataclysm which has put the Socialist party in power. The leader of the Socialist party issues the following statement: "The policy of the Socialist party has been accepted by the people of Canada as the instrument of national development.... This Dominion-wide expression of confidence insures a solid government." The Capitalist prime minister may well reply: "In times past when elections were a game between 'Ins' and 'Outs' for the spoils of office, it was one of the rules that after an election the leader of the victorious party always referred to the emphatic mandate which the people had just given him, and the defeated prime minister always said that he bowed to the will of the people. We all realized how absurd it was to talk this way when we knew very well that all the election results meant was that three or two or possibly only one voter in every hundred had changed his party allegiance. However, one party had to be content to be the opposition and we knew that though our parties differed on matters which we considered in public to be of great importance, yet men of all parties were agreed on general principles of government. We were, therefore, content to accept the manifest absurdities of the democratic electoral system and to pay lip service to such phrases as 'the will of the people.' You Socialists have changed all that. You have made of elections an instrument in the class war. Do you seriously think

when you have declared war against our class, when you have threatened it with destruction, that we will give in without a struggle simply because you have managed to increase your vote from 46 per cent. in the last election to 49 per cent. in this? It is patently ridiculous to say that the people of Canada have declared in favour of Socialism. They certainly have not. Our Capitalist government is not going to turn the Dominion of Canada over to you so that you can turn it into a Socialist commonwealth, until we are convinced that a substantial majority of the people of Canada really want Socialism."

Is it drawing too long a bow to picture this as a possible result of the last election had it been fought not between Liberals and Conservatives but between Capitalists and Socialists? Will vested Capitalist interests accept a verdict of annihilation passed upon them at the sort of general election to which we are accustomed? Should the answer to that question be no, then democratic government will break down if the differences between our political parties become too great—if our parties instead of being opportunist and heterogeneous become doctrinaire and homogeneous.

One can probably dismiss this question as being academic. The future may witness in Canada a struggle between a Socialist party and a Capitalist party, but by the time the Socialist party becomes a serious contender for office it will probably differ from the Capitalist party by almost as little as the present Conservative party differs from the Liberal party. A constitutional Socialist party, which, after many years of propaganda, has managed to secure 46 per cent. of the vote at one general election, is going to strain every nerve to get the support of another 5 per cent. of the electorate and thus insure a parliamentary majority at the next election. That extra

5 per cent. of the electorate which it wants to capture will be composed for the most part of "doubtful" voters—people who are not certain whether they should vote for Capitalism or for Socialism or whether they will stay at home on polling day. This group of non-combatants, standing between the rival armies of Capitalists and Socialists, will keep the country from civil war, for both parties will be angling for their votes, and in order to get their votes each party will tone down its programme. The result will be that the political colour of the two parties will become almost indistinguishable. That is what seems to be happening in England to-day. Both parties are playing for the vote of the man in the middle of the road, who is usually a Liberal. The National government will go as far in the direction of Liberalism as is possible without running grave danger of losing a substantial number of supporters from its right wing. The Labour party will likewise become as Liberal as is consistent with keeping its left wing. The English Liberal party is dead but the next election may witness its triumphant resurrection, not in the flesh but in the spirit.

Should, however, this sort of development not take place in England or in this country, should political parties in the future become sharply divided in their attitude to public questions, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that there is grave danger that the democratic structure cannot stand the strain; that a fight between fairly evenly matched parties which, in deadly earnest, differ fundamentally on the proper basis for society, will bring into existence a revolutionary situation.

Must we, therefore, hope that in the future as in the past our party politics may continue to be a sham struggle between "Ins" and "Outs"? The dilemma is that if they do continue to be a sham struggle between "Ins" and

"Outs," each party caring for principles only so much as is consistent with the attainment of office, the policy of each party being evolved out of an intricate process of bargaining between regional, racial, occupational, and religious groups, each party frightened to act boldly because to act boldly may mean losing votes, each party content to live from hand to mouth, to solve the problems of the day as they arise—will not our failure to act boldly lead to a breakdown of the whole social system, or to a discrediting of democracy, and the success of revolutionary movements dependent upon force?

The answer of intelligent England to that question was given in the great manifesto on "Liberty and Democratic Leadership" which appeared in February, 1934.[5] There is scarcely a man or woman who stands, in the estimation of the civilized world, for the greatness of contemporary England, who is not numbered among its hundred and fifty signatories. Here are the names of some of them: from religion, the Archbishop of York, L. P. Jacks; from the universities, A. D. Lindsay, Gilbert Murray; from literature, Sassoon, Priestley, Virginia and Leonard Woolf, Nevinson, and Tomlinson; from science, Eddington, Rutherford, Julian Huxley; from politics, Viscount Cecil, John Buchan, Harold Macmillan, Basil Blackett, Lord Eustace Percy, Herbert Samuel, Lansbury, Dalton, Noel Baker, Bromley, Pugh. On what are these representatives of all political parties or of none agreed? They are agreed on this. If modern democracy is to survive the attacks of the believers in violence, the leaders of political parties must offer the voters not slow and timid measures of advance, but scientific schemes of a far-sighted and far-reaching order for immediate international and national reorganization of our economic life.

[5] *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, February 23, 1934.

They speak of the necessity for a "bold lead," for "swift and far-reaching measures."

But what chance is there in Canada of "calm, efficient, and active" party leaders asking the people to approve swift and far-reaching measures of international and national economic reorganization, commending the programme of measures to the people "by the methods of reason, and asking that they be judged on their merits alone"?

The history of Canadian democracy does not offer us much encouragement. The platforms of Canadian parties have in the past been the result of political necessities, not of national needs. The acts of a government have been the result of barter between sectional and racial groups for their own immediate selfish advantage. Party programmes and government legislation have most certainly not been the result of a scientific study of the demonstrable needs of the situation. A second and a third transcontinental railway followed the first, not because a scientific study of Canada's long-run needs proved that those railways were necessary, but because building them was good politics. Railway-building meant contributions to party funds from contractors; it meant the bestowal of jobs to party workers; it meant favours for loyal or doubtful constituencies. Railway-building meant power for politicians and profits for railway-builders. The fact that it would probably involve the people of Canada in huge losses was of minor importance.

Nor have our party leaders in the past ever asked the people to approve swift and far-reaching measures. Perhaps up to the War it was not necessary that they should, for government then played a comparatively minor rôle in the national life of Canada. Since the War, and especially since the depression, swift and far-reaching mea-

sures have been essential; yet they were not embodied in the election programmes of Liberals or Conservatives at the last general election, nor at the time of writing have they been embodied in the programmes of the two major parties for the forthcoming election.

It is, in fact, not unfair to say that party leaders in Canada have seldom thought of themselves as *leaders*. Their rôle has not been to give a lead to the public; it has been to act as brokers between warring sectional groups. The best of our leaders will say in private when asked to press for some reform: "Yes, I agree that we ought to carry out what you propose. If you elect to parliament members of my party who are in favour of that reform, you can depend on me to go as far as I possibly can to meet your wishes." In other words the Canadian party leader has been content to go where pushed by public opinion as reflected in parliament. He has seldom appealed to the people to support a policy unless he has felt reasonably certain that the people were already in favour of that policy.

The bankruptcy of democracy in Canada is nowhere better exemplified than in the behaviour of the Liberal leaders during the past four years. Their whole strategy has been based on the confident expectation that the depression would defeat any government, that all they had to do was to play safe and as far as possible to avoid committing themselves on any important public question. During 1932 and 1933 this policy was attacked by the Liberal left wing, but the left wing was defeated by the party strategists; and unless a miracle happens the Liberal party will enter the next election without any scientific programme for meeting the needs of the Canadian situation. If by any remote chance it does produce such a programme before polling day, there will most certainly

not be time for it to be commended to the people by the methods of reason. It will be put over with the blare of high-pressure salesmanship, with the result that it will not have behind it the support of an intelligent and informed public opinion and the vested interests can, with very little trouble, make certain that it is still-born. The last four years of Liberal strategy may well be successful in giving the Liberal party four years of office. It may also be successful in giving Canada only a few more years of democratic government.

As far as the giving of leadership is concerned, the record of Mr. Bennett during the present year has been distinctly better than that of Mr. Mackenzie King. Mr. Bennett has given leadership to public opinion in Canada more vigorous and constructive and courageous than any which we have received since the War from Liberal or Conservative leaders. That is not to say that it has been particularly bold nor that the measures which he has advanced are sufficiently scientific, swift, and far-reaching to accomplish tha speedy reorganization of our economic life which the conditions of to-day demand. They obviously are not and Mr. Bennett would be the first to admit it. He has, in fact, already admitted it, for he has said that there is one problem, the solution of which is a "condition precedent to recovery," yet he has himself put forward no solution for that problem.

Up to the present the C.C.F. has been the only party which has put forward a far-reaching programme of economic reconstruction. It did this in its Regina manifesto adopted at its first annual convention in 1933. So far as the propagandists for the C.C.F. have urged the acceptance of that long-run programme upon the Canadian people, the C.C.F. has been giving a most valuable leadership in political thinking in Canada. But even

supporters of the C.C.F. will admit that when municipal, provincial, or federal elections take place, many, if not most, of their speakers soft-pedal the Regina manifesto and seize instead upon some current political issue of minor importance on which it is easier to arouse emotion and to get votes. The danger is, of course, that the nearer the C.C.F. gets to power, and the more politically experienced its members become, the greater is the likelihood that it will put in cold-storage its far-reaching programme of economic reconstruction.

This is not to say that democratic government can be saved in Canada only if the people elect this year either a Conservative government with a more scientific programme than it has yet advanced, or a C.C.F. government which will adhere to its Regina manifesto. What does seem clear, however, is this: democracy cannot be saved in this or in any other country unless the leaders of those political parties which still believe in democracy appreciate "the urgency of securing peace and justice by reorganization without delay in both international and national affairs" and realize that this reorganization can only be accomplished by democratic means if they themselves treat "democracy with a new respect, offering scientific schemes of a far-sighted and far-reaching order, commending them by the methods of reason, and asking that they be judged on their merits alone." If the leaders of the Conservative, Liberal, and C.C.F. parties in Canada do not provide this leadership, there will grow with amazing rapidity in this country a belief in the futility of democratic institutions. Our people, like the peoples of most of Europe, will become a fertile soil for political movements which appeal "to passion and violence in place of reason and persuasion" and which advocate the establishment of dictatorship.

REVIEWS

THE FOURTEENTH COLONY*

WILLIAM BENNETT MUNRO

IN its broader phases the American Revolution has not lacked historians. Lecky, Fiske, Trevelyan, Van Tyne, Egerton, Fisher, and Jameson have explored it from their varied points of view, while every general history of the United States accords it both space and prominence as the dividing line in the evolution of American nationalism. The average politician south of the border is inclined to believe, indeed, that the beginnings of all free government and human liberty date from the Declaration of 1776.

But Canada's part in this upheaval has hitherto had scant attention. Both British and American writers have been inclined to view this aspect of the case as relatively inconsequential, with no appreciable influence upon the final outcome, and hence not entitled to much consideration. The invasion of Canada has been looked upon as a sort of Galipoli expedition which did not have much, if any, bearing upon what went on in the main theatre of operations. Professor Wrong has corrected a number of such notions in his *Canada and the American Revolution*, which is a worthy sequel to his earlier volumes on the *Rise and Fall of New France*.

Most Americans have never been able to understand why the "fourteenth colony" did not go along with the other thirteen. This is because of their relative unfamiliarity with what had happened in Canada and in England during the interval between the Peace of Paris and the Declaration of Independence. These thirteen years were of critical importance in determining the ultimate decision of the French Canadians, and that is why Professor Wrong devotes more than half his book to things which transpired before the embattled farmers began their sport of sniping at the redcoats. To understand the attitude of Canadians towards the overtures from the south, it is self-evident that one must know something of how the people lived in the stretch of northland along the St. Lawrence, who their leaders were, and what the habitant was thinking about—when he thought at all.

**Canada and the American Revolution*, by George M. Wrong, Macmillan Company of Canada.

All this the author sets forth cogently and in an engaging way. Contrary to the traditional impression, he finds that relatively few of the French inhabitants left Canada in the years following the conquest. Being freely permitted to go, they preferred to stay—which is what French Canadians usually do. The habitant was robust and self-reliant; he could make a living more easily in Canada than in France as a member of the oppressed third estate; what he wanted was to be left alone on his ribbon of fertile land, and he soon found that the new suzerains were willing to let him have this privilege. At least two-thirds, probably more, of these people knew nothing of the world outside their own little *côtes*, or shore-villages, where the new masters of the colony never appeared at all. Revolutions do not thrive in such soil.

Nevertheless, the English newcomers in Canada made some serious errors and narrowly avoided a few fatal ones. Military governors were none too conciliatory. As always in newly-conquered lands, there were officials who betrayed their trust. The short-lived attempt to impose English common law on the colony made for confusion. There was ominous unrest among the Indian tribes in the western regions, and the Pontiac uprising gave the colony an anxious interlude. But on the whole the transition years following 1763 were passed with less disorder and discontent than might have been expected. Things were quieting in Canada while they were being stirred up in the other colonies.

A survey of this stirring-up process occupies several chapters of the book. The author reviews the British political system under George III, explains the principal enactments which sought to control colonial trade, examines the merits of the controversy about stamp taxes, and describes the over-dramatized Boston tea-party. All this is well-trodden ground, but it is traversed again without stumbling. Professor Wrong shows himself familiar with whatever is valuable in the literature relating to this tremulous decade and recounts the story with a good deal of vigour yet without undue partisanship. Most students of American history will agree with his general conclusion that "while stamps and tea made good ammunition for social discontent, they were not its first causes."

Canada loomed up during these years as a barrier to the extension of New World democracy. From the earliest settlement its people had been given no share in their government, nor was there any serious demand for it. The Roman Catholic Church, secure

in its privileges and property, could see no profit in a departure from the existing order. Hence though the zest for democracy became almost a religion along the Atlantic seaboard, it found itself stalled at the Canadian boundaries. There it was checkmated by another idealism, the traditional respect of the people for their ancient faith and for constituted civil authority. These people had so firmly acquired the habit of rendering obeisance to Caesar that the revolutionary pietisms of Tom Paine and Thomas Jefferson could not wean them away from it.

Meanwhile there were visions of a vaster Canada which would include the great Mississippi region. This western area was now British domain, but how should it be governed? Quebec was a long way off, and the maintenance of authority along the inland water-route from the St. Lawrence to the southern gulf would be a difficult, as well as an expensive, undertaking. In London the royal advisers pondered this problem and received all manner of advice concerning it, but not until 1774 did they reach a decision. By the Act of that year the Province of Quebec was extended in its bounds from Labrador to Louisiana. Over this imperial area the civil law of French Canada was then installed as the law of the land, and the Catholic Church was confirmed in all its established privileges. Thus, as the author points out, both Versailles and Rome were given a grip on the heart of a whole continent. This far-flung territory, moreover, was to have no self-government. A governor and council, appointed from London, were to rule it.

Of course the English colonies along the Atlantic seaboard resented these provisions of the Quebec Act. To them it seemed that they were being designedly encircled, both north and west, by a cordon of alien institutions. Bourbons and Popes were alike anathema to them. So the colonial leaders fumed against this oppression of the great hinterland. Undoubtedly the Quebec Act helped to accentuate the atmosphere of suspicion which already enshrouded the English colonies; on the other hand it proved to be a factor of no inconsiderable importance in keeping Canada out of the American Revolution. For when the storm broke, the Canadians found themselves without any serious grievances. To be sure, they had not yet learned to love Old England much, but they had been schooled to love New England even less. The Catholic Puritan, which the habitant was, continued the animosity toward the Protestant Puritan which he had acquired in the pre-conquest

days of border raids and frontier fighting. "It seems a strange paradox," as Professor Wrong aptly says, "that had Canada not then been French, it might not to-day be British."

After a brief survey of the opening events in the War of American Independence the narrative devotes adequate attention to the invasion of Canada by the colonial forces. The priests and the seigneurs were against the invaders and did what they could to rouse the people, but the habitant looked upon the quarrel as no affair of his. Recruiting officers met with hostility in the parishes, and, even when the Americans were nearing Montreal, not a single French Canadian could be induced to join the defending forces. It was not that these people were afraid to fight; they had shown plenty of *élan* in the days of Montcalm and Vaudreuil; but they wanted to know what they were being asked to fight for, and no one could tell them. So they remained aloof, but sold supplies and furnished guides to both sides with equal readiness so long as they got paid for it. As combatants they neither helped the invader nor stood in his way.

Perhaps it was inconsistent for the seaboard colonies to demand government by consent of the governed for themselves, while refusing to concede Canada the same liberty of choice. Rebelling against British coercion they were quite ready to do some coercing on their own account. But this was only because self-preservation is the first law of nations as of nature, and before the inexorable logic of facts all semblance of consistency had to give way. Canada was a threat to the colonial cause. It was a base of operations which the mother country could use to prolong the war indefinitely. For that reason the revolting colonies wanted Quebec in their own hands and they set out to get it. Their failure was a genuine disappointment throughout the thirteen new commonwealths.

Following the close of the war came the problem of the Tories, as they are called south of the border, or Loyalists north of it. The author is pretty severe on the persecutors of those people whose misfortune it was to have backed the wrong horse. Washington, he says, regarded all Loyalists as "cowards, traitors, the vilest of mankind, unfit to live." Perhaps so, but that does not sound like the great Virginian. Looking through Professor Wrong's extended recital of the variegated brutalities inflicted on these Loyalists, one is tempted to ask whether Carlyle may not have been right when he averred that "history is a distillation of rumour." In any event

an equal amount of space might just as easily be given to the counter-ravagings in which the Tories participated. When Sam Adams (Professor Wrong calls him *Samual*, p. 386) stigmatized these Tories as "pusillanimous cowards," he did their courage an injustice, but those to whom such vituperation was addressed were quite equal to retorts in kind. Civil war, when it assumes guerilla form, does not have the amenities of a golf game.

The Congress of the Confederation (it should not be called the Congress of the United States until 1789) did what it could to succour the Loyalists. But in the nature of things there was not much that it could do. The federal government, under the Articles of Confederation, lacked the power which it later obtained under the constitution. So the several states did about as they pleased in the matter of persecutions despite the promises of the federal authorities. Canada, however, was an ultimate beneficiary of this harshness for it drove the Loyalists in large numbers to the shelter of British protection. By the labour of their hands these exiles changed the face of Upper Canada. And in the War of 1812 their grandsons successfully defended the new fatherland. The story of these pioneers is one of the most dramatic in the history of the New World, and Professor Wrong makes the most of it.

There is no Canadian who would not be proud to have written this book. Professor Wrong's industrious pen has been illumining the pathways of history for almost half a century, but never to more worthy purpose than in the present volume. It is a fine piece of historical writing, generous in conception, logical in plan, accurate in workmanship, and fully maintaining the high level of literary distinction which we have learned to expect from this Nestor among Canadian disciples of Clio. May his days be long in the land!

History is to nations what memory is to man. Serving as the chart and compass of national endeavour, it gives guidance to the duties of the hour, whether the sailing be rough or smooth. As a chronicle of troublous times among people of the English tongue, therefore, Professor Wrong's volume is by no means devoid of its lessons for to-day.

MINUET*

A. F. B. Clark

The word "minuet" evokes various abstract associations and concrete images, such as: the eighteenth century; grace and wit; a long melodic phrase with subtle harmonies on the harpsichord; above all, a slow, stately dance in which the partners approach with dignity, curtsey to each other, take hands, then separate and withdraw, avoiding any suggestion of intimate union. It thus concentrates in itself, with that brevity which is the soul of wit, both the matter and the manner of Professor Green's remarkable study of Anglo-French literary relations in the eighteenth century. Perhaps the author does not intend us to pursue the musical or choregraphic analogies indefinitely, but I cannot resist saying that Professor Green has absorbed not only the clearness, lightness of touch, and wit of his chosen century, but something also of its love of complex polyphony, for at times the counterpoint of his English and French themes becomes intricate in the extreme.

This is the book that many a *comparatiste* has dreamed of writing (it was simply crying out to be written), but has lacked the ability, the knowledge, or the industry to bring to fruition. Professor Green is almost the ideal literary scholar. He has minute erudition, yet he obviously regards literature primarily as a living art, not as a *cadaver* for the social historian to dissect; besides, he is a born writer; what is even more uncommon among literary scholars, he has the philosophic mind; rarest of all, he seems to have some insight, not only into books, but into life and character—a gift that saves him from those naïve judgments in dealing with the "criticism of life" implicit in novels and plays, that make the *obiter dicta* of scholars so often a source of innocent merriment. When such an instrument of precision starts operating on such a field as the combined literatures of France and England in the eighteenth century, the result is such that we may cry with Dryden: "Here, at last, is God's plenty"—for we revel in a banquet of enthusiastic appreciations, witty excoriations, new discoveries in literary his-

**Minuet: A Critical Survey of French and English Literary Ideas in the Eighteenth Century*, by F. C. Green, J. M. Dent and Sons.

tory, exquisitely chosen quotations, philosophical analyses, lapidary phrases and aphorisms, French *nuances* and English gusto.

The primary theme of Professor Green's "minuet" may be summed up in the following sentences, taken from the first and last pages of his book: "Nations, like individuals, can be intensely curious about each other, and, having satisfied their curiosity, continue to behave as before. Besides, literary genius is essentially racial and the books which exercise an international appeal are very rare." "In closing this survey I am led to the irresistible conclusion that the cosmopolitan spirit left no deep or lasting imprint upon the imaginative literature of eighteenth-century France or England." The secondary themes (if we elect to pursue the musical analogy) or the partners who curtsey and touch hands but nothing more (if we prefer the image of the dance) are the "literary geniuses" of France and England, and these geniuses may, in Professor Green's judgment, be summed up in the words "Cartesianism" and "Experimentalism" respectively. This idea—though not an original discovery of the author—has never been applied so extensively and so searchingly in a study of the literary masterpieces of the two countries as in this book. Perhaps the admirable chapter entitled "The Philosopher and the Dramatist" (containing the finest parallel study of Shakespeare and Racine in English criticism, not excluding Lytton Strachey's) is the best illustration of what Professor Green means by his antithesis; but the parallel studies of Le Sage and Smollett, of Marivaux and Richardson, of Diderot and Sterne, in the section on "The Novel," are hardly inferior achievements in comparative criticism. In other chapters, the author studies the attempts of Voltaire, Ducis, La Place, and Le Tourneur to naturalize Shakespeare on the French stage, and also the points of contact between the English middle-class tragedies and sentimental comedies on the one hand and the French *drame* and *genre sérieux* on the other. In every case he concludes that all that is vital in the original is lost in the "sea-change." In the section on "Poetry," the only English poet to whom he will grant a vital influence on French poetry is Pope; the "graveyard" school, the "nature" poets like Thomson, are translated but not really assimilated in their true essence.

The upshot of the book, then, would appear to be a negation of the claims allegedly made by the proponents of "comparative literature." But is not Professor Green—in this didactic "drift"

of his book—tending to tilt against windmills or break in open doors? What reputable *comparatiste* would maintain that the "spirit" of one national literature can supplant that of another? To thrash this question out is impossible here, but we may note Professor Green's admission that his survey "owes its genesis" to those theses and articles "which, from an excess of zeal, have tended to prove too much and to suggest too little," and his recognition that his strictures "imply no criticism of the comparative method itself, the value of which has been amply proved by the works of its leading exponents." It is unfortunate that he has made so little allusion to the constructive aspects of these "works" in the course of his survey. The fact is that the "law" of comparative literature has been formulated once for all by M. Baldensperger in a *locus classicus*:

> Il est bien certain qu'une époque littéraire, lorsqu'elle découvre et qu'elle annexe des idées et des formes exotiques, ne goûte et ne retient vraiment que les éléments dont elle porte, par suite de sa propre évolution organique, l'intuition et le désir en elle-même. Les influences étrangères, à qui l'on fait une gloire ou un crime, suivant les points de vue, de libérer ou de dévoyer une littérature, n'agissent jamais que dans une direction conforme aux tendances de celle-ci. . . . Il est en effet de ces actions intellectuelles comme des destinées morales des individus, où l'on donne des conseils, mais où l'on n'inspire point de conduite. Ces conseils, ce sont les œuvres qui, issues d'un autre système de civilisation, renferment déjà en acte, et parfois avec excès, ce qui n'est encore qu'en puissance en deçà des frontières.

Now the novel in France and England advanced almost *pari passu*; if anything the French novel was ahead of the English and would therefore be the least inclined to borrow from its neighbour. As for the drama, though it was decadent in both countries, yet the national tradition was better upheld in France than in England; here, too, the student of comparative literature would not expect, on principle, any vital influence. The case with "poetry" is on a different footing, and here I am inclined to think that Professor Green underestimates the English influence; for here, undoubtedly, there did exist *en acte* in England what was only *en puissance* in France. But in the history of Anglo-French relations there is one case that is a superb example of M. Baldensperger's law. As it occurred mainly before the close of the seventeenth century, it might be considered to fall outside the *cadre* of Professor Green's book. But he has exposed himself to criticism by introducing it

into his picture and then treating it in a surprisingly inadequate way. I refer to the cavalier manner in which he disposes of the problem of Boileau's influence in England, a subject which has challenged the attention of a number of students in recent years. Professor Green makes no allusion to the results of their researches, not even to the monumental work of M. Audra, *L'Influence française dans l'œuvre de Pope*. The absence of a section devoted to "Criticism" (where, I think, the give and take of ideas could be shown to be really fruitful) is also regrettable, if a fair estimate of the comparative method is to be arrived at.

A minor defect is the inordinate space devoted to summaries of the plots of well-known novels like *Clarissa* and *La Nouvelle Héloïse*. This seems peculiarly otiose; for who is likely to read this book but those who are familiar with the main landmarks of eighteenth-century literature? The space thus saved might well have been devoted to ampler references and bibliographical material, for surely this book is addressed mainly to the scholarly reader. Professor Green has, no doubt, the English scholar's traditional and laudable aversion to messing his page up with a pedantic *apparatus criticus*, but did not Professor Lowes hit on the solution of this problem when he "kennel'd his notes in the rear" of his *Road to Xanadu*? At all events, the scholar is hardly satisfied when confronted in the text with a quotation from an eighteenth-century periodical, with the laconic footnote "1758," without reference to volume and page. The book is also disfigured by some serious misprints. Why is the *Revue de Littérature comparée* always referred to as the *Revue de la Littérature comparée*?

Word comes that the author of this book is leaving his post at the University of Toronto to occupy the chair of French at Cambridge. Will the day never come when we can retain in Canada the services of men who really distinguish themselves as literary scholars to help us to build up a tradition of productive activity in this most backward of all branches of our academic life?

VICTORIANS REVALUED*

LOUIS CAZAMIAN

A reader of Lord David Cecil's *Victorian Novelists* might well hazard the conjecture, from the method and manner of this excellent survey, that its noble author must have had some experience of the lecture-room—on the teacher's side. His aim is so clearly defined; it is reached with such orderly progress; each chapter is so carefully planned; and the findings for and against each writer are so deliberately numbered and marshalled. But that the work has solidity, and no visible amateurishness, is by no means the highest praise that it deserves. The whole book displays genuine insight, nice judgment, a beautiful sanity, and a fine sense of literary values. We are given a penetrating, and what matters even more, a just estimate of writers who have been for a long time under a cloud of more or less systematic depreciation.

Lord David Cecil is that rare thing, a judge of literature who has really thought out his standards and revolves round his own centre. The vagaries of fashion seem to leave him unperturbed. Not only does he not join in the hue and cry against the Victorians; but he quietly pricks the bubble of a whole generation's conceited injustice in holding up to scorn the prodigious blunders of their immediate predecessors. The Victorians, they said for instance, were grotesquely self-centred. No one thought, however, of charging the same fault upon the Elizabethans: "Critics rebuked Tennyson for representing Lancelot as an English gentleman of 1860, but were only interested when Shakespeare represented Troilus as an English gentleman of 1590." At the same time Lord David will not be too hard upon the anti-Victorian iconoclasts; their error was a familiar one: "The last age, like a relation, is too close for a man to be able to view it with the detachment necessary for criticism." But why should propinquity in time so narrow our judgment? Lord David surely, in spite of his disclaimer, is well aware of the reason. We need not go to the Freudian doctor

**Early Victorian Novelists: Essays in Revaluation*, by Lord David Cecil, Constable and Company (The Macmillan Company of Canada).

to learn that even normal children will react against their parents. Intolerance and unfairness are vital necessities when we must at all costs make room for ourselves. As the Victorians were provided in excess with the parental instinct, the Edwardians and the Georgians had an overdose of the opposition complex. Anyhow, the tide is now turning: the Victorians are far enough from us to be no longer annoying; they will gradually recover the benefit of our impartiality; they are recovering it already. Lord David hails the change with justifiable humour: "Tennyson is admired again; it is Conrad not Carlyle whom the lively Rhadamanthuses of our weekly reviews are condemning to everlasting oblivion." His book must not be viewed, in fact, as one of the fruits of that revival; he belongs to the class who anticipate those turns of the mode, do not follow them; and the common critic has not yet made up his mind that it is becoming the safer course to extol the Victorians. But Lord David's kindly though clear-sighted valuation of the leading English novelists from Dickens to George Eliot should do much to quicken the fresher and more genial interest that begins to be felt in them.

It is a pleasure to watch the distinguished critic at work upon such different temperaments, outlooks, and arts as those of Dickens, Thackeray, Charlotte Brontë, Emily Brontë, Mrs. Gaskell, Trollope, and George Eliot. Although he duly recognizes and defines the common background of their work, and the Victorian quality that is shared by all, an exquisite perception of individual features enables him to draw portraits of the most striking life-likeness. The breadth and the variety of sympathy thus evinced are truly remarkable. The Dickens is good, but so is the Thackeray. The Charlotte Brontë chapter could hardly be improved upon; and yet, Mrs. Gaskell as well is felicitously drawn. Who could have expected a warm admirer of Trollope to be no less fair and warm to the much-abused memory of George Eliot? All those essays are rich in discriminating and suggestive remarks; but the study of Emily Brontë is probably the best in the book; the analysis of *Wuthering Heights* adds an original contribution to our critical intelligence of her work. That analysis has the thoroughness which one associates with the competence of the trained specialist. Although no unnecessary display is made of technicalities, the practice of each writer, indeed, is fully studied, the qualities, good and bad, being followed up to their sources, and the

proper emphasis being laid on the elements of that complex thing, the unique world of a novelist. I must confess that I detect no flaw in the aesthetic appreciations thus presented, the cumulative effect of which is to heighten our admiration for artists all endowed, more or less, with the highest faculty of the novel-writer—the creative imagination. There the virtue of the whole school lies. In the abundance and force of that creative power, our author rightly concludes, is the foundation of that life which saves the masterpieces of the period from the blight of time, and redeems their glaring faults.

Lord David's point of view, he gives us to understand, is exclusively literary. He means to leave out the "social, historical and personal aspect" of his many-sided subject. He does still pay a just tribute, in a pregnant passage, to the special appeal of Dickens as the prophet of a moral and social philosophy. We are the more surprised to find that the same appreciation is not extended to Mrs. Gaskell's parallel effort as a novelist with a purpose. Might it be that the purpose in this case was too boldly and openly defiant of the established order of things? *Mary Barton* and even *North and South* meet with scanty justice, for once, from our broad-minded critic: "Her employers and spinners are wooden mouthpieces, not flesh-and-blood individuals; her arguments are anthologies of platitude," *etc.* Reliable English authorities of the period bear witness to the delicate, the intuitive perception which stood Mrs. Gaskell, here as elsewhere, in good stead; her workmen are far and away the best that the novel of the time can offer us; and as for her "arguments," they are not found fault with by the most sober representatives of the new economy which tends to arise on the wreck of *laissez-faire.* One might point out, as well, some inconsiderate statements here and there: "No one," the author says of Thackeray, "has ever been better at manipulating a huge mass of material." We gather a very different impression farther on: "Thackeray . . . is a very uncertain craftsman . . . . In his more conventionally ordered books his hold on structure is very slack . . . . And he is almost always too long . . . . He repeats himself." We could as well demur to the short shrift given George Eliot's rational faith: "She was not religious." This is, to say the least, dogmatic. But we shall hardly bear Lord David a grudge on that account, since he has put in a vigorous plea for the most seriously undervalued, at present, of the major Victorian novelists, and even

claims for her a particular significance as the pioneer of the modern form of the novel. Altogether, too much should not be made of those blemishes; and the author must be thanked for one of the soundest books recently written on the controversial subject of Victorian literature.